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A Cost-Benefit Analysis of a Monetary Union for




Potential costs and benefits of a monetary union for the
four MERCOSUR countries Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay
are compared.. Particular emphasis was put on the traditional
and new approaches to optimum currency area theory which were
reviewed and analyzed with respect to their validity for less
developed economies. Based on these insights 7 theses have been
developed and thereafter were tested empirically, as far as
empirical material was available. Evidently MERCOSUR will not
start negotiating a treaty on a MERCOSUR monetary union à la
Maastricht tomorrow. The necessary institutional framework is
de facto non-existent. Further the member countries have shown
little willingness of monetary cooperation in the past.
Nonetheless, the creation of a single MERCOSUR currency could
serve as political lubricant for deepening integration. Such a
deepening of the integration process could go hand in hand with
sound and coordinated macroeconomic management which in turn
could lead to more stability and increased credibility in the
region.
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1  Introduction
The Treaty of Asuncion, the founding document of the Common Market of the South
(MERCOSUR), was signed in 1991 by the four member states Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay. The transition of the customs union took five years and from the economic point of
view was extraordinarily successful in its initial stage. Despite marked skepticism by many
economists, MERCOSUR intra-trade doubled within this period. At that time MERCOSUR
seemed to be the most successful integration project of several decades. In order to keep the
momentum of the integration process on 27 April 1997 the Argentinean and the Brazilian
president of state, Carlos Menem and Enrique Cardoso, expressed their intention of establishing
a single currency for MERCOSUR by 2012. They clearly had in mind the European Economic
and Monetary Union as a model for MERCOSUR. So far, this description would look like a
linear development toward a monetary union of MERCOSUR.
However, the Brazilian maxi-devaluation in 1999 und the economic downturn in
Argentina from 1997 on until the time of writing forced the tow large MERCOSUR economies
to concentrate on other economic policy fields. Monetary disintegration seemed to take place.
Brazil abandoned an asymmetrical band with the dollar (Bacha, 1997). The Argentina currency
board was weakened, first, by the introduction of an official commercial exchange rate
weitghted by the dollar and the euro (Kronberger, 2001b); second, the “arbolitos” (Bazzan,
2001) appeard back on the street that were exchanging pesos against dollars on the black market.
Nonetheless, disintegration with the dollar does not mean that there is not a monetary union
option for MERCOSUR. On the contrary, monetary disintegration with the dollar could enable
monetary rapprochment between the MERCOSUR countries that seemed somewhat unrealistic
due to the fact, that Argentina und Uruguay showed a high degree of dollarization and the other
two MERCOSUR countries did not.
Several works have already been published that tackle the question whether
MERCOSUR is apt for a common currency by using the traditional approach to optimum
currency area theory. For the analysis indicators like the symmetry of shocks, the degree of trade
openness, simplified measures of seignorage, elasticicities between trade and GDP, etc. were
applied empirically. Unsurprisingly more often than not it was concluded that MERCOSUR
does not form an optimum currency area. This work aims at adding some crucial points to the
rather superficial mainstream discussion, which in consequence may lead to fundamentally
differing conclusions. These crucial points were the taking into account the aspects of
developing/emerging countries, the findings of the  ‘new’ optimum currency area and an
extensive empirical analysis.
1
Potential benefits and costs of the creation of a single currency of less developed
member states will be compared. Optimum currency area theory will be reviewed and,
importantly, analyzed for its validity for less developed economies. Based on these insights 7
theses have been developed that thereafter were tested empirically, as far as empirical material
was available. Assumedly benefits of a common currency are even more difficult to grasp for
developing/emerging economies than for developed economies. Welfare gains by policy
coordination can be important, although rather within than outside the monetary union. If
dynamic integration gains are analyzed the question has to be permitted whether prior
development of the national economies offers more potential for dynamic gains than economic
integration itself. On the cost side it is asked whether devaluations are really effective in
                                                
1 See Kronberger(2001a,pp. 114) on a discussion what dollarization could mean for the creation of a
common currency other than the dollar in (partly) dollarized economies.2
developing/emerging countries. Are they effective short-term or long-term? Traditional
optimum currency area is critically reviewed. Theoretically as well as empirically the traditional
optimum currency area theory leaves many questions unanswered. When the ‘new’ optimum
currency area theory is brought into play it cannot be dismissed that MERCOSUR may become
an optimum currency area in the future. Trade integration might make the cycles of the
MERCOSUR countries converge. The creation of common political institutions and respective
common rules would likely lend a common MERCOSUR currency increased credibility, though
there is a long way to develop these institutions.
Some of the posed questions could not always be given concrete answers. Certainly it
was always intended to provide as concrete and as detailed answers as possible. Sometimes
approximations or even speculations about future development had to serve as answers.
Nonetheless the latter were instrumented with the purpose of tackling interesting and also
important issues for the involved policy makers.3
2  The Benefits of a Common Currency
Monetary unions are frequently evaluated with emphasis on the cost side of their
creation. The early optimum currency area literature concentrates almost exclusively on the
analysis of the cost of a monetary union. More recent optimum currency area (OCA) literature
revises many of the findings, as far as costs are concerned (compare 3.2.3). The benefits of
monetary union to date have received limited attention. Economic theory as well as empirical
evidence leave much to be desired in many fields of optimum currency area theory. Further, on
the benefit side OCA theory often disregards aspects found in the more general microeconomic
theory on money.
2
The objective of this chapter is to briefly review benefits of the establishment of a
common currency. If particularities applying to less industrialized economies are of importance,
they will be pointed out, for example, reduced depth of financial markets, a less efficient
financial sector of developing/emerging countries in general, which in turn might result into a
relatively larger growth potential, or reduced network and credibility effects.This sections
comprises four subsections: (1) welfare gains of policy coordination which are very difficult to
determine empirically (2) Network externalities and monetary union. (3), Implications of the
new growth theory for the creation of a monetary union. Specifically the possible effects of
financial development on growth – since transactions cost in developing countries are elevated –
are of interest. This is due to the fact that financial markets in developing/emerging economies
tend to be less efficient and thus, theoretically allow for a relatively higher growth potential by
possibly catching up to the efficiency standards of more developed industrialized economies.
2.1  Welfare Gains by Policy Coordination
As soon as two economies are analyzed that are linked by trade and/or capital flows
economic interdependence can be observed. The use of a policy instrument in one country may
have welfare implications for the other country. Cases exist where the coordination of policies
might improve welfare for the participating countries. This relationship can either be of a
relatively symmetrical nature (interdependence) or of an asymmetrical nature (dependence). At
least two approaches for economic analysis of this problem exist. (1) A two- or more-country
model is set up and the management of their policy instruments and its effect(s) on the
respective economy(ies) is (are) analyzed.
3 (2) A more strategic approach is applied by game
theoretical considerations. The authorities (policy makers) aim at maximizing their social
welfare function. The welfare function depends positively on the fulfillment of the objectives.
Furthermore, the welfare function is conditioned by the economic system and by other
countries’ policy management.
4 Whatever approach is used information about the economic
model, the welfare function has to be known in order to reap welfare gains by coordination. The
                                                
2 E.g. Niehans(1980) elaborated a treatise on monetary theory. Inter alia, this work reconciles micro- and
macroeconomic theory.
3 Assume a two country model with one internal and one external policy objective per country. In total they
have four instruments (assume government expenditure and the interest rate) at their disposal. If the target is an
equilibrated balance of payments, it has to be balanced for both countries. Thus, four instruments are at disposal and
only three targets are present. If there are  n countries and  n-1 countries have their balance of payments in
equilibrium the nth country will also find its balance of payments in equilibrium without having done anything. The
remaining target could then be defined by common consensus.
4 Compare Hamada(1974), the seminal work in game theory.4
players will rarely dispose of this information in real world. Nonetheless, two cases can be
identified, where by the fact of creating a monetary union will help to avoid competitive, and
thus possibly harmful, policies between member countries. (1) Competitive devaluations
(beggar-thy-neighbor policy) are ruled out by the simple fact of an existing single currency. (2)
Within the monetary union speculative attacks can be avoided.
5
(1) The first argument has been used frequently in the context of the creation of
European Economic and Monetary Union. Sectoral interests will press hard – or already did so
in the European Community – for the avoidance of disproportionate exchange rate swings
(competitive devaluations).
6 Both, importers and exporters have a strong interest in maintaining
favorable (or at least stable) relative prices.
(2) The second argument– speculative attacks within the monetary union can be ruled
out - is rather hypothetical for a small monetary union largely dependent on foreign capital.
Assume four relatively small countries forming a monetary union, whose joint GDP does not
even represent a fourth of the GDP of the important economic players as, for instance, the USA.
Moreover, these other important economic players are the most important foreign investors in
the monetary union. It is thus more than questionable that speculative attacks between member
states of the monetary union will have played an important role before forming the monetary
union.
A single monetary policy of a monetary union, however, is not equal to a coordinated
monetary policy between a group of economies. If the various members of a monetary union are
characterized by a different financial market structure of the single members, by varying
regulations in the national financial markets, a single monetary policy might prove not to be
optimal for all members of a monetary union.
THESIS 1: A common currency avoids beggar-thy-neighbor policies in terms of
competitive devaluations vis-à-vis other monetary union members. The maxi-
devaluation of Brazil in January 1999 caused considerable economic cost for the
rest of MERCOSUR, that by the theoretical existence of a common currency, could
have been avoided.
                                                
5 Compare Bofinger(1993, pp. 144) and Ishiyama(1975, p. 362)
6 Compare Eichengreen(1996, p. 2)5
2.2  Network Externalities
Yet in the early microeconomic theory of money it was recognized that as the number of
monies increases its exchange becomes less convenient and more expensive and thus its utilities
decrease, from the individual as well as from the national point of view. Already Mill(1894)
recognized “So much barbarism, however, still remains in the transaction of most civilised
nations, that almost all independent countries choose to assert their nationality by having, to
their own inconvenience and that of their neighbors, a peculiar currency of their own“
The increased size of a currency area is assumed to reap scale economies not only with
respect to transaction holdings for non-banks and within the production function of banks
7 but
also the utility of money will increase in general. In the context of the more recent optimum
currency area theory, Dowd and Greenaway (1993, pp. 1180) considered network effects of
money. Network effects of the respective money will not be existent to their full extent on day
zero of the introduction of a new currency, but have to evolve over time (since it is a dynamic
process). Money is assumed not to be neutral and as result will create externalities.
8 Network
effects might lead agents to decide whether to hold a particular currency or not. The utility of the
particular currency increases with its public good characteristics. The utility of the currency is
dependent on the number of other agents using the same currency or as Brunner and Meltzer
(1971) put it: ”The marginal cost of acquiring information about the properties of any asset
does not vary randomly within a social group and declines as the frequency with which the
group uses a particular asset increases.”
Even though the use of a particular currency might result advantageously due to its
increased network qualities, an agent formerly holding a less advantageous currency will face
switching costs when changing from one currency to the other. Non-institutionalized switching
– that is, economic agents switching to the use of another currency regardless of whether
national authorities allow it
9 or not - tends to occur only in the face of an increasingly unstable
environment.
2.3  Growth and Monetary Union
Network externalities are relatively subtle and difficult to account for. Economic growth
as a result of monetary integration does convey a simple outcome, despite the fact that growth
theory represents a controversial field of economic theory. Baldwin(1991) identifies five main
channels which foster economic efficiency in an economic and monetary union and
consequently may have beneficial effects on output growth:
(1) Elimination of transaction costs
(2) Improved allocation of common market capital
(3) Intensified cross-border competitive pressures
(4) Higher efficiency of corporate ownership
(5) Increased output as a result of reduced and converged inflation rates
                                                
7 Compare Niehans(1980, p. 130). Theoretically it is relatively demanding to integrate scale economies of
monetary transactions into a general theory of money.
8 For an extensive treatment of money externalities see Caravelis(1994, pp. 190).
9 The institutional aspect should not be underestimated. Even though it is easy to switch the currency in the
private sector, the authorities may insist on receiving tax payments and may affect transfers in the domestic currency
despite its perceived utility.6
The static gains will have immediate welfare effects whereas dynamic gains will
materialize over time. With growth theory these dynamic gains can be grasped. Baldwin
estimates medium-term growth by the means of the traditional growth theory (neo-classical
growth model). Constant returns to scale are assumed. Liberalization will induce capital
formation over time through the channels enumerated before. Thus, an initial efficiency gain
will be enforced by an increased capital stock which, in consequence, will lead to a higher per
capita GDP growth than the static efficiency gains alone. Nevertheless, the traditional growth
model does not explain for lasting growth effects. The induced capital formation does not have a
permanent effect on growth, since the steady-state growth rates of per capita output, capital and
consumption are not altered.
10 The neo-classical growth model ”will not provide explanations of
the determinant of long-run per capita growth” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995, p. 19).
On the contrary, endogenous growth models allow for accelerating growth. Returns are
no longer diminishing. An extra unit of capital raises output independently from the capital-labor
ratio. The overall level of efficiency now affects the per-capita-GDP growth permanently.
Crucial to the endogenous growth model is the inclusion of scale economies. These scale
economies can be reaped through research and development (R&D) investments of individual
firms, who thus maintain their leading edge over their rivals or through external economies of
scale.
11
2.4  Growth and Financial Development
The preceding section dealt with growth stimulation through a monetary and economic
union. Several channels promoting growth were assumed. Considering developing countries and
an integrational scheme, which is not as advanced as the European Economic and Monetary
Union the above presented model would seem unrealistic. Sticking to the conjecture that
financial development is triggered by government, pertinent active policy measures would have
to be undertaken, for instance, the facilitation of a legal environment apt to liberalization and
deepening of the financial market preceding the introduction of a single currency.
12 However,
starting with the assumption of underdeveloped financial markets in developing countries the
growth potential in the long run - when introducing a single currency in a final stage - could be
even larger than in developing countries.
13 Nonetheless, it is left open to which extent a single
member of the integration scheme would be able to foster growth by national financial
efficiency augmenting measures alone and to which extent additional growth would be
attributable to the creation of monetary union.
In developing/emerging economies banks play the most important role in the financial
                                                
10 The neo-classical growth model conjectures diminishing returns on capital. Additional output per worker
will decrease with a rising capital-labor ratio. As increased investment is equal to postponed consumption additional
output growth at a certain point will not suffice to maintain investment. The capital-labor ratio will return to its
initial level.
11 See EG Kommission(1990, pp. 86), De Grauwe(1992, pp. 71) or Barro and Sala-i-Martin(1995) which
graphically analyze the differences between the two growth models concerned.
12 Some authors, inter alia, Bencivenga and Smith(1991, p. 196) take financial development as an
exogenous factor, which is determined by legislation and government.
13 Molle(1997, p. 216) adds to efficiency gains reaped through a deeper financial market the following
benefits:
(1) With the increasing size of capital markets the disturbance risk tends to disappear.
(2) Production conditions become more balanced since more enterprises gain access to financing facilities which
allows for a more perfect competition within the common market.7
sector, leaving the importance of equity or bond markets far behind. Fees and commissions, etc.
charged the financial intermediation services are relatively high.
14 In fact these transaction costs
are actually withheld from investment activities that would alternatively contribute to economic
growth. Pagano(1993) provides the following formal framework. The simplest form of an
endogenous growth model is assumed where aggregate output yt is a linear function of the
aggregate capital stock kt.
t t Ak y = ( 2-1 )
Returns to scale are constant and returns to capital are not diminishing. Only a single
good is produced which can be either consumed or invested. The invested good faces a rate of
depreciation d. Then gross investment can be written as:
t t t k k I ) 1 ( 1 d - - = + ( 2-2 )
As indicated in the first paragraph financial agents keep a fraction of savings equals to 1
- m for their intermediation activities. The savings-investment equation becomes
1 0 , < < = m m t t I S ( 2-3 )
The steady-state growth rate takes the form





Equation ( 2-4 ) elucidates three possible channels through which financial development
might have an effect on economic growth:
(1) The saving rate could be stimulated though ambiguous effects can emerge. The
availability of consumer credit might discourage households from saving hence exercising
downward pressure on the saving rate. Moreover, the introduction of insurance markets -
assuming risk-averse individuals - lowers the necessity of precautionary savings. Thus, the
degree of risk aversion will determine whether saving activities increase or fall.
(2) Cost of financial intermediation might decrease (m increases) thus allocating a larger
share of saving to investment. The fraction 1-m is absorbed by banks generating their income by
spreads between borrowing and lending rates and sale and purchase of foreign exchange and by
other financial agents as, for instance, brokers or dealers who charge commissions and fees. In
addition, this fraction might also represent monopoly rents for the intermediaries or taxation in
the form of transaction taxes.
(3) Finally, the marginal productivity of the capital stock A might augment. Contrary to
the majority of the individual investors, financial intermediaries can use portfolio techniques to
                                                
14 King and Levine(1993, p. 540) stress four functions which a developed financial system has to fulfil:
(1) Evaluation of potential investment projects and their selection
(2) Raising of the resources necessary to finance the selected projects
(3) Facilitation of risk diversification to investors
(4) Revelation of ”the potential rewards to engaging in innovation, relative to continuing to make existing products
with existing techniques”8
mitigate risk of single investment projects thus improving the risk-return relationship.
15
Furthermore, financial intermediaries dispose of advantages in the collection of information with
regard to the evaluation of alternative investment projects. In the absence of a sufficiently deep
financial sector too much capital might be directed toward relatively unproductive liquid assets
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991, p. 197).
Even if financial development exercised downward pressure on the saving rate, still two
channels would remain to outweigh this possible negative effect on growth. Either the reduction
of large spreads between lending and borrowing rates typical for developing countries or/and 
provision of liquidity services to relatively risky investments which otherwise could not have
been provided - omitting risk sharing - might well contribute positively to economic growth.
                                                
15 Bencivenga and Smith (1991, p. 203) deduce from their 3-generations model that if agents are risk-
averse the “presence of competitive intermediaries” leads to higher growth.9
3  The Costs of a Common Currency
The costs of the creation of a common currency are frequently put into relation with the
traditional approaches of optimum currency area (OCA) theory pioneered by Mundell(1961).
16
The approach of the latter infers from the absence of factor mobility between two regions, that a
flexible exchange rate is needed for adjustment in the presence of an asymmetrical exogenous
disturbance. In economic discussions the loss of the exchange rate instrument was often put
forward as the main argument against monetary union. This approach however, faces several
limitations worthy of some analysis: A flexible exchange rate will not always provide
adjustment as required. Is the exchange rate really capable of effectively cushioning shocks?
Will the exchange rate always move in the indicated direction? Does a link between the real
exchange rate and productivity exist? Do devaluations always tend to be beneficial to output in
developing/emerging economies?
Particular aspects concerning developing/emerging countries are referred to, in addition
to the exchange-rate section. First, a typology of shocks is provided. It will become evident that
traditional OCA theory only covers a more limited range of disturbances than is actually
relevant (compare subsection  3.2.1). In particular, endogenous shocks resulting from bad
macroeconomic management and subsequent stabilization attempts received little attention up to
now. In subsection 3.2.2 prominent approaches to the traditional OCA theory are reconsidered.
Their assumptions are shown, as well as their weaknesses. Findings of the ‘new’ OCA theory
are presented in subsection 3.2.3. Some findings have substantially altered the way we look at
the OCA theory as for instance, endogeneity which is now seen in a different context, as far as
developing/emerging countries are concerned. A track record of asymmetrical endogenous
policy shocks in developing/emerging countries indicates that a sound and continuous political
and economic policy coordination represents a precondition for the successful establishment of a
monetary union. Moreover, time inconsistency literature has shown that economic agents
behave strategically. Accordingly, if devaluation expectations occur, devaluations are likely to
be ineffective anyway.
3.1  Exchange Rate Considerations in the Context of the OCA Theory
Traditional OCA theory emphasizes the cost of introducing a monetary union in terms of
loss of the exchange rate instrument. Underlying assumptions relative to the working of the
exchange rate are mistaken. Nonetheless, some economists are tempted to draw important
conclusions from applying these traditional approaches without reviewing them carefully and
critically.
17 Yet some economists still tend to adhere to traditional OCA theory approaches. The
views about the functioning of the exchange rate in these approaches, however, are sometimes
mistaken.
                                                
16 Traditional OCA theory comprises the seminal work of Mundell(1961), McKinnon(1963), and Kenen
(1967). These approaches are analyzed in 3.2.2.
17 A monetary union for Mercosur became an issue when Argentina presided MERCOSUR in 1997. As a
consequence, first works about MERCOSUR and OCA theory were presented. Some of these works are
Giambiagi(1997), Lavagna and Giambiagi(1998), Licandro Ferrando (1998), Yeyati and Sturzenegger(1999a). Their
focus had been primarily directed toward the traditional approaches to OCA theory without paying too much
attention to underlying assumptions and often neglecting the new OCA theory.10
In a static Mundell-Fleming (MF) model with perfect capital mobility as outlined in
Gandolfo(1995, pp. 295) a monetary expansionary policy of an economy would induce a
depreciation and consequently an improvement of the current account and an increase of output.
Under these assumptions prices are rigid and therefore a change in the nominal exchange rate
translates completely into a change of the real exchange rate. In a portfolio model under static
expectations a link between the exchange rate and monetary equilibrium can be established.
Such a model is more realistic, particularly in the Latin American context. The assumption of
rigid prices (especially upwards would not find too many advocates there. With respect to short
term results the MF model and the portfolio balance approach are similar. Moreover, the
portfolio balance approach comes up for one caveat of the MF model, it considers stocks and
flows simultaneously. In the presence of monetary expansion output will not increase as much
as in the MF model. Nominal depreciation will be accompanied by an increase in the price level,
therefore the increase in the real monetary stock is limited and output will not increase as much
under the MF model.
THESIS 2: In the past devaluations of Latin American currencies often proved to
be highly ineffective. Under the assumption that devaluations continue to be
ineffective a single currency would not impose costs on the single member countries
in terms of the loss of an adjustment instrument. Nonetheless, the Brazilian maxi-
devaluation of January 1999 showed a relatively high degree of effectiveness.
If the exchange rate is looked at from a long-term perspective – with particular emphasis
on the real exchange rate - the distinction of two strands of exchange rate models is important:
(1) The real exchange rate is determined by the relative price of imports to exports (Edwards,
1989). (2) The real exchange rate is – inter alia – determined by differences in productivity
(Claasen, 1996, pp. 172). In a classical model productivity changes are translated fully into
changes of the nominal wages. The real exchange rate remains unchanged. If, on the contrary,
productivity changes have to be born out completely by a change in product prices, the real
exchange rate has to adjust. For example a gain in labor productivity would result in a real
appreciation.
De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) show that the truth probably lies somewhere in between
the two extreme positions (productivity changes are fully transmitted to nominal wages versus
productivity changes are fully transmitted to the product prices).
18 Hence, the possibility that
productivity differences will influence the real exchange rate cannot be dismissed. Countries
with considerable productivity growth differences joining a monetary or an exchange rate union
might face costs, if they relinquish the exchange rate instrument. Suppose a positive supply
shock caused by technological process in the tradable sector in Brazil. If productivity increases
are fully transmitted to wages, workers - under the assumption that they are equally skilled - will
move from the nontradable sector to the tradable sector until wages are equalized in both sectors.
However, assuming higher income elasticity of the demand for nontradables than for the
demand for tradables and an unchanged demand structure the price of nontradables will increase
more than the price of tradables resulting in an appreciated real exchange.
19
                                                
18 They apply their simple static framework empirically to 14 OECD countries.
19 However, the application of policies dampening aggregate demand (for example, a tight monetary
policy) could at least reduce the upward pressure on nontradables, but at the expense of output growth in the short
run (possibly in the long run too).11
THESIS 3: Differences in productivity combined with inflexible real wages might
require the exchange rate instrument for adjustment over the long run. These
preconditions apply to MERCOSUR.
The assumption that productivity increases, are fully conveyed to nominal wage
increases, is dependent on the nature of institutional arrangements. Usually the presence of
strong unions and thus a strong bargaining power of labor is needed; that workers will take the
full profit from growth of productivity. However, if a negative shock to productivity occurs and
the unions use their bargaining power alike, and thus will not agree to a reduction of nominal
wages, the whole adjustment burden has to be born out by product prices. This is a scenario
which is common in many developing countries and in particular in many Latin American
countries, where in the past powerful wage indexation mechanism had been in effect.
20
3.2  Optimum Currency Area Theory
3.2.1  Nature of Disturbances and the Exchange Rate
Section 3.2.2 covers the old approaches to OCA theory. What these approaches have in
common is that they remain rather unspecific about the nature of disturbances that affect a single
or a group of economies. This section will offer a more general view of shocks and will hereby
classify possible shocks. It will be shown which type of shock affecting an economy, renders the
exchange rate instrument necessary for adjustment.
Diagram  3-1 provides an outline of temporary disturbances, possibly requiring the
exchange rate instrument for restoring internal and external equilibrium, for a group of two or
more countries. As modeled in 3.2.2.1 a country suffering from an asymmetrical external shock,
lacking alternative adjustment mechanisms, will most likely need the exchange rate instrument
for adjustment in order to avoid pronounced decreases in output. But not only demand shifts as
in  3.2.2.1 but also cyclical asymmetries could possibly render the discretionary use of the
exchange rate instrument more optimal.
                                                
20 One source where this argument can be found is Levi Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999a). Moreover, to
some extent this aspect will be dealt with in the empirical part of this work. (4.5.2.2).12
3.2.1.1  Temporary Shocks
Asymmetrical






Symmetrical External Different economic structure
Diagram 3-1: Typology of shocks requiring differentiated responses per country
Changing from the aggregate level, to the sector level shows that if a specific industry in
a hardly diversified economy or even in a diversified economy, where this sector is relatively
large, is hit by a negative asymmetrical shock, the economy as a whole might be affected by this
type of shock (compare 3.2.2.3). However, these disturbances do not necessarily have to be
exogenous. Shocks can also be ‘home-made’. Assume the Argentinean authorities opted for a
significant tax raise. Such a policy move would likely dampen overall demand, thus possibly
having the same consequences a an exogenous demand disturbance requiring the exchange rate
for adjustment. Similar effects could be produced by other policy areas, too. It has to be stressed,
however, that policy shocks are controllable to a certain extent. Thus, the question has to be
permitted whether they were desired from an overall point of view (Bergmann, 1995, p. 1254).
In particular, in the context of developing or ‘emerging’ economies policy shocks are imposed
comparatively more often by the means of stabilization programs accounting for significant
variations in output.
But even symmetrical shocks might require differing policy responses. Suppose another
oil shock would happen. Brazil imports significantly more oil than Argentina does, since the
former possesses a relatively larger energy sector, and produces more oil. Suppose further, that
Brazil uses energy as an input for its metal processing. The more expensive energy input would
also increase the price of its industrial exports. In such a scenario a devaluation could render
Brazil’s exports less competitive.
THESIS 4: The cost of a single currency will be lower, the more symmetrical the
shocks to the member countries occur. Since the creation of MERCOSUR external
shocks to the economies occurred rather symmetrically, except the effects of the
Brazilian maxi-devaluation in January 1999, which can be viewed as endogenous
shock.
3.2.1.2  Permanent Shocks
Basically the types of shocks described before have been well covered in the old OCA
theory. Nonetheless, a long-term perspective is needed to complete the picture. Seen from the
view of classical economics the nominal exchange rate does not possess the ability to balance
internal and external disequilibria, since in the long run money is neutral. Permanent shocks are13
thus caused by structural problems requiring other policy responses than a change of the
nominal exchange rate. Suppose Argentina faces a demand shock in its industrial sector because
its products have become obsolete. Adjustment for this sector can hardly be eased by the means
of an open capital account. For example, Brazilian banks would provide short-term loans for
troubled Argentinean enterprise hoping that these enterprises would not default before the
maturity of their debt (this would imply, for example, that the respective enterprises would have
managed a fast and successful turn-around by introducing new products - compare 3.2.2.1.1). In
such a case, default risk could be reduced by devaluation, thus, reducing the Argentinean
product prices or alternatively structural changes as product innovation could be envisaged,
which would probably be a mid- to long-term strategy.
It can be assumed that changes (shocks) in productivity are not fully transmitted to
product prices. This is even more so, if a high degree of wage indexation prevails. In such an
environment productivity changes are likely to cause changes in the real exchange rate. Ongoing
real appreciation will therefore put increasing pressure on the nominal exchange rate requiring
occasional devaluations.
All in all, a brief overview of real disturbances possibly requiring the exchange rate
instrument for adjustment has just been presented. Nonetheless, it cannot be taken for granted
that such shocks will definitely occur. If in the past the Argentinean dairy industry was hit by a
negative exogenous demand shock stemming from Brazil, this must not necessarily be the case
in the future. Historicist assumptions should thus be avoided.
3.2.1.3  Monetary Shocks
OCA Theory is widely associated with shocks originating from the goods market.
21 In
the real world monetary shocks are common as well. In particular, in countries with less sound
financial and monetary management, monetary shocks are an important source of disturbances.
Leaving aside  the assumptions of an emerging economy, as in the case of Argentina and Brazil,
assume that the authorities are prone to use the instruments of inflation tax and devaluations
excessively. In such a setting, where monetary shocks to the economy prevail, a fixed exchange
rate will represent a more ideal instrument than the flexible exchange rate for stabilizing the
economy.
22,23 In a Mundell-Fleming world, with perfect capital mobility, the nominal interest
rate is given exogenously and assumed to be constant, which implies a constant expected rate of
exchange rate depreciation. Consequently the fixed exchange rate is the appropriate tool for
limiting shocks to the money market.
3.2.2  Predominantly Temporary Real Shocks
Under a flexible exchange rate regime monetary policy constitutes the optimal policy
instrument in a Mundell-Fleming world in the short run. The consideration of the monetary
policy instrument under a flexible exchange regime in a portfolio balance model under static and
under rational expectations did not only establish a link between the price level and the
exchange rate, but also demonstrated the phenomenon of exchange rate overshooting.
24 In
addition, the introduction of rational expectations yielded the monetary policy instrument, in
case of an anticipated monetary expansion, relative to the static MF model much less effective in
                                                
21 This view goes back to the traditonal approaches of the OCA theory as presented in section 3.2.2.
22 Compare Buiter(1999a, p. 26).
23 Ricci(1997, p. 34) formalized an OCA model where one criterion is the negative correlation of monetary
disturbances.
24 Advocates of fixed exchange rates allege the phenomenon of overshooting of introducing additional
volatility into the exchange rate.14
terms of output.
25 In the middle and in the long-term, other than temporary shocks, for instance,
productivity differentials may create demand for adjustment. These findings should change the
way traditional approaches to OCA theory are seen. The traditional approaches to OCA theory
are presented in the following subsection.
3.2.2.1  A Temporary Demand Shift from Argentina to Brazil – The Mundellian
Approach to OCA Theory
Assume a Mundell-Fleming world. There happens to be a demand shift away from
Argentinean to Brazilian products (a negative real disturbance to the Argentinean economy).
Again, perfectly mobile capital is assumed. Overall demand for Argentinean goods has
decreased, which in turn will exert downward pressure on income and output. Reduced money
demand will bring about a decrease in the domestic interest rate (the RR schedule – the goods
market equilibirium - shifts to the left and theoretically the new equilibrium between the goods
and the money market could be found at E’). The interest differential will cause capital to flow
out.
26 Balance of payments turns negative.  E’ lies south of the  BB schedule – balance of
payments equilibrium - that is identical to the foreign interest rate axis, and the exchange rate












Diagram 3-2: Real disturbance in a static Mundell-Fleming model
with perfect capital mobility under a flexible exchange rate regime
What would happen, if the exchange rate were fixed? Again, reduced money demand
would lead to a decreased domestic interest rate provoking capital outflows. Monetary
authorities would have to intervene by buying domestic currency. However, these interventions
are only effective in the very short run without being able to maintain a lower interest rate for
increasing the output. Thus, the monetary authorities have no control over the money stock
(under the assumption of no sterilization). The  RR schedule would shift to the left as a
consequence of the shrunken real money base. Since the domestic interest rate cannot stay
below the international interest rate and the current account balance cannot improve, output and
income will be further reduced finding new equilibrium in E”.
A very similar setting served Mundell(1961) to develop his seminal approach to the
OCA theory. Before addressing his approach the underlying assumptions will be presented:
                                                
25 In developing/emerging countries devaluations may even prove to exert a depressing effect on output
(compare – inter alia – Lizondo and Montiel, 1989; Agènor and Montiel,1996, pp. 248).
26 Because of the interest rate differential.15
•  Contrary to the MF model no distinction between the use of the monetary and
fiscal policy instruments was made. He sees both instruments generally as one
aggregate demand management.
•  A flexible exchange rate always balances internal and external disequilibrium.
The exchange rate instrument works efficiently, as well as, effectively.
•  Wages and prices are rigid (like in the MF model).
•  Factors like capital and labor are internally mobile and externally immobile.
•  The three objectives of price stability, full employment and external balance
have to be achieved simultaneously.
•  No distinction between permanent and temporary shocks are made.
Mundell’s approach to the OCA theory is as follows: Suppose Argentina and Brazil
formed a monetary union. As before a demand shift from Argentinean to Brazilian products
would occur. Zero capital mobility is assumed. Argentina would run a current account deficit
and output would decrease. If the Brazilian authorities were unwilling to increase inflation (they
would not lower their interest rate),
27 Argentina would suffer the full consequences of the
demand shift, that is, output would decrease at the expense of employment. For restoring
internal and external equilibrium alternative instruments for adjustment would be needed. The
alternative instrument proposed by Mundell, was factor mobility.
3.2.2.1.1  Capital Mobility
In the MF model (see above), full capital mobility was assumed. Interest rate differences
between countries possessing an open capital account would be arbitraged within a relatively
short period of time. Thus, the interest rate at best can be used for attracting capital inflows
temporarily. As soon as the interest rate is forced back to the international level of the interest
rate these inflows would stop, and they would revert again. As a relatively short period of time is
considered, it is extremely unlikely that the demand shift would have been reverted or the
current account, by any other means, would have been equilibrated.
28
(De Grauwe, 1989, pp. 138) makes the point by using a model of Ricardian equivalence
with imperfect foresight that the cumulative current account position might influence the interest
rate in such a way that increasing default risk would drive up the interest rate in terms of a risk
premium. This phenomenon is often found in developing countries.
29 The mechanism of
equilibrating capital flows might prove non-existent or at least asymmetrical. Add a high degree
of external indebtedness to the previously presented demand shift from Argentina. Fearing
default risk, foreign investors are likely to withdraw their short-term capital from the
Argentinean financial system. Subsequently pressure toward devaluation will evolve. In the
presence of a weak financial system the government would have to bail out the banks. As a
                                                
27 In the real world a comparable case was the dominant role of Germany within the European Monetary
System (EMS) at the beginning of the nineties. Germany, who faced a boom that was motivated by the unification of
the former Eastern Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany raised its interest rate. This interest rise had
negative repercussions in terms of output on the rest of the EMS members.
28 The reason for such deficit financing can be found in Eichengreen(1990, p. 143). Accordingly in a
monetary union – under both types of monetary integration: fixed exchange rates and a single currency –  these
capital flows would work powerfully. Devaluation risk in the presence of a balance-of-payments crisis would be
foregone. Consequently, investors would not incur the risk of capital loss. Even, if such a scenario would correspond
to reality, the economy or region concerned would suffer higher interest rate payments; putting a further strain on
economic activity.
29 Developing economies are often characterized by a weaker financial system (i.e. due to private financial
mismanagement and inadequate supervision). Even the liquidity of the treasury might not be guaranteed.16
consequence the government itself would be forced to assume a short foreign-currency position
in order to avoid a collapse of the domestic banking system. Hence, the government runs short
of foreign exchange reserves putting a constraint on borrowing in the world credit markets
(Obstfeld, 1998, p. 26).
30
The above described capital movements do reflect changes in the fundamental variables.
Adverse short-term capital movements, however, might even occur in the absence of the
deterioration of the Argentina’s current account. Assume that instead of Argentina, Brazil is hit
by an exogenous demand disturbance, resulting from the European Union. Brazil’s accumulated
current account situation is assumed to be highly negative, not so Argentina’s. Now Foreign
investors might not only withdraw short-term capital from Brazil but also from Argentina as the
result of so called ‘herd behavior’. Such behavior occurs if investors diversify widely without
worrying about information, since it does not pay for them to become more thoroughly
informed. Hence, they are merely following others reinforcing the volatility of capital flows
(Calvo and Mendoza, 1997).
So far short-term capital movements were indicated, which were motivated within the
private sector. Theoretically, a fiscal transfer between members of a monetary union could
provide an alternate adjustment mechanism.
31 In the traditional Mundell-Fleming model under
perfect capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate the monetary policy instrument becomes
absolutely ineffective. Only fiscal policy remains as the sole effective policy instrument. The
demand shift modeled at the beginning of 3.2.2.1 could now be helped by transferring public
funds from Brazil to Argentina. Argentina would not have to reduce its public spending
drastically and pressure on real wages, as without these transfers. It has been stressed before,
that a temporary demand shift is considered.
Hence, if a distinction between stabilizing and redistributive flows is made, it is the
former that would (partially) eliminate temporary imbalances. The latter provides long term
adjustment resulting from structural differences within the regions or economies (Bayoumi and
Masson, 1994).
32 This mechanism of fiscal federalism proves to be quite problematic for already
developed economies forming a monetary union. The European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU) does not have powerful stabilizing flow mechanisms, nor are redistributive flows of
significance relative to GDP per-capita. Considerations of national sovereignty represent the
main barrier for the setting up of a mechanism that transfers funds from one sovereign nation to
the other. Regarding developing/emerging countries the establishment of such a mechanism
seems even less likely. Tax collection usually works less efficiently and effectively compared to
more developed economies, thus, putting fiscal income on a relatively less solid base. In
conclusion, if fiscal income already represents a relatively ‘scarce good’ within an economy, it
is illusory to think of fiscal transfers between national economies.
33
                                                
30 Government stands here for either the central bank or for the treasury; e.g., it is the French Treasury who
fulfills the function as a lender of last resort for the African central banks of the CFA-Franc zone (Berrigan and
Carré, 1997).
31 Various works try to shed light on the implications of fiscal flows for monetary unions, inter alia,
Eichengreen and von Hagen(1995), and Dornbusch(1997).
32 Taking the European Union as a reference, redistributive flows would correspond, inter alia, with the so
called ‘Cohesion Funds’. Bayoumi and Masson(1994) report that in the EU a decline of approximately 1 US $ in
national income is compensated for by an increase of US $0.03 of the structural funds for the period of 1989 to
1993. Stabilizing transfers are almost negligible in the EU. In Canada and in the US redistributive flows compensate
US $ 0.39 and US $ 0.22 respectively for a 1$ decrease in per capita income.
33 When considering long-term capital movements in a small open economy the equation for the trade
balance or net foreign investment respectively for Argentina and Brazil can be written:
SA - IA = NX
SB – IB = -NX17
3.2.2.1.2  Labor Mobility
Besides capital, labor represents the other factor facilitating adjustment according to
Mundell (1961, p. 664).
34 The demand shift from Argentina to Brazil results into an increased
demand for labor in the latter country. Assume an internationally mobile labor force in
Argentina. In the presence of higher unemployment, Argentinean workers are prepared to move
to Brazil, satisfying augmented Brazilian labor demand. The Argentinean current account would
again tend toward equilibrium, since less Brazilian exports to Argentina would be demanded, by
a then shrunken Argentinean labor force. By analogy, emigrated Argentineans (to Brazil) would
transform a part of the former Argentinean export demand into the Brazilian domestic demand.
Assume the demand shift in question would put a temporari strain on the Argentinean
current account only. Thereafter, the Argentinean current account would turn positive, as the
demand shift would have reverted. Then if labor mobility were the only adjustment mechanism,
the previously emigrated Argentinean workers would need to return to their home country in
order to restore equilibrium between the two countries again. Thus, for balancing temporary
shocks at least one of the two countries requires a mobile labor force, who move according to
the state of the current account balance. That is, migration in theory would need to be
‘reversible’.
35 Nevertheless, labor cannot move as easily, as for instance, capital since labor
migration imposes social and cultural costs (e.g. language and different way of thinking).
Moreover, labor demand in one country would have to coincide with the expelled labor force of
the other country and vice versa, a requisite unlikely to be found in reality..
36
3.2.2.1.3  Wage Flexibility
As just seen the case was made against labor mobility as a means of adjustment. In
contrast, wage flexibility seems to be a working adjustment mechanism found more often in
reality. As before rigid wages are assumed. An extension to the MF model allowing for flexible
wages will be presented. The real demand equation takes the following form (Argy, 1994, pp.
85):
 37
yd=d(y,r,i)+x(r) ( 3-1 )
Real domestic demand and demand for exports is now a function of the real exchange
rate (r=e-pd).
38
X(r)-rm(y,i,r)+K(i)=0 ( 3-2 )
The same applies to the balance of payments equation. Further a variable, the price level
p, is added to the money demand function.Thus, the money market takes the following form:
                                                                                                                                           
If at the same time when Argentina suffers the negative demand shock, incentives to saving S A are less
relative to investment IA and the reverse development can be observed for Brazil; the current account of Argentina
would continue to deteriorate. Again, under the assumption of rigid wages and rigid prices unemployment in
Argentina would increase (Fleming, 1971).
34 However, Mundell(1961) does not clearly distinguish between the two factors labor and capital in his
analysis.
35 This reasoning can be found in Buiter(1995, p. 30) and Ricci(1997, p. 25).
36 When considering asymmetrical cyclical movements, labor force is thus required to respond to migration
movements at cyclical frequencies.
37 As a recognized study EG Kommission(1990) is one of the first to  refer to real wage flexibility in the
context of the OCA Theory. Mundell(1961) assumed rigid wages. Compare assumptions in 3.2.2.1.
38 The variables of this equation are denoted in logarithms.18
M*=L(y,i,pd) ( 3-3 )
The major change to a simple MF model is that the real aggregate supply is modeled.
With technology fixed and a given stock of capital, output will depend negatively on the real
wage wr.
ys=s(wr) ( 3-4 )
The consumer price index depends positively on the domestic price level  pd and
positively on the nominal exchange rate e also.
p=p(pd,e) ( 3-5 )
The wage rate is a function of the consumer prices. This equation is written in
logarithms. The nominal wage rate is linked over the degree of wage indexation to the changes
in the general price level p.
w=pp ( 3-6 )
Finally, real aggregate supply denotes:
ys=ys(pd,p,e) ( 3-7 )
Equilibrium in the goods market is then established by:
ys=yd ( 3-8 )
If the degree of wage indexation were set at 0 in equation ( 3-6 ), equation ( 3-7 ) could
be changed to ys=ys(pd). Further, it could be assumed that prices in this equation were fixed.
Next, if the capital account were completely open, the same set of assumption, as in the MF
model, would prevail. Assuming full wage indexation (completely flexible nominal wages)
would render monetary policy completely ineffective, regardless of the degree of capital
mobility.
39 Moreover, the real exchange rate would remain unchanged.
More interesting, is the case of flexible real wages under a fixed exchange rate regime.
Assume the same demand shift as in Diagram 3-2. Resulting from lower income and output the
RR schedule will shift to the left. If prices were fixed, the LL schedule would also move to the
left as to establish new equilibrium in E”. The flexible price assumption would allow producers
to reduce real wages - nominal wages would have to grow slower than the domestic price – this
way a real depreciation could take place without having to alter the nominal exchange rate.
3.2.2.2  Openness of the Economy and Stability of the Domestic Price Level
It was only a question of time until Mundell’s approach was challenged by others.
McKinnon(1963) introduced additional to the criterion of factor mobility the one of openness.
Suppose Argentina was a small extremely open economy.
40 Openness is defined in terms of the
                                                
39 Zero capital mobility, as assumed by Mundell(1969) for his OCA approach, yields the same result.
Regarding fiscal policy with zero capital mobility in the extended MF model, fiscal policy becomes completely
ineffective, too. Fiscal policy will become more effective, the more the capital account opens.
40 This criterion is now almost common sense and part of  many textbooks, for example, ”In general the
smaller the region the higher the marginal propensity to import will be - an unsurprising proposition. But from this19
share of tradables (as the sum of importables and exportables) of the total product of an
economy. As before assume that Argentina is hit by an external demand shock. If Argentina
now devalued, the effects on output would be limited, if present at all. Recall equation ( 3-5 ). In
an extremely open economy the general price level is dominated by the import prices
represented in this equation by the nominal exchange rate e. The probability of wage illusion in
such an open economy is negligibly small. Thus, adjustment could not be facilitated via the
wage channel nor via the nominal exchange rate. The exchange rate instrument in such an
economy becomes obsolete. The structuralist school made a somewhat differing but still
relatively similar point, in the context of developing countries.
41 How could this economy
restore equilibrium then? Only by the means of fiscal policy. The government could, for
example, reduce its real expenditure, which should result in an improvement of the balance of
payments.
However, a prerequisite for abolishing a flexible exchange rate regime would be that
“Price stability prevails in the rest of the world” (Ishiyama, 1975, p. 352). If the main trade
partners exhibited volatile price levels or frequently used the exchange rate instrument, they
would also export volatility to the domestic economy. Therefore, in a highly volatile
environment flexible exchange rates could be of some utility for small open economies in order
to insulate them from exogenous shocks.
3.2.2.3  More Than Two Goods – A Diversified Economy
Up to now just two-good economies were considered, goods that were exported, goods
that were imported and when dealing with the quantitative model a distinction between a traded
and a non-traded goods sector was also made. Nonetheless, in reality an economy will produce
more than one product at a time, which it exports. As before a demand shift from Argentina to
Brazil is assumed. In addition, the Argentinean economy now produces ten products. The
assumed demand shift affects but a single export product that represents a tenth of total exports.
Simply by “the law of large numbers” the effect on the balance of payments will be much
reduced compared to the single product economy (Kenen, 1967, p. 49). As a result, the exchange
rate instrument for restoring external and internal balance is comparatively less needed.
In addition, if Argentina were even more diversified - if it produced additional 10 import
competing products - and even its major export products were affected by an exogenous demand
disturbance, the downward pressure on economic activity would not be as pronounced as
without a diversified import-competing goods sector. Suppose the import-competing sector’s
elasticity of labor demand with respect to real wages were high. This sector would now possess
the ability to absorb the unemployed workers of the export sector; all the more so, if the link
between investment and exports is considered. Greater diversity might help to stabilize capital
formation. As with exports, variations in investment might average out by the law of large
numbers.
42
What might be puzzling, is that more diversified economies tend to be large and
                                                                                                                                           
it follows that the smaller the region the easier it will be for that region to adjust to external shocks by relatively
acceptable changes in real incomes and wealth, without having to rely on relative price changes: whereas large,
self-sufficient regions would have to undertake massive shifts in incomes (wealth) to maintain external equilibrium,
in the absence of relative price changes.”(Goodhart, 1989, pp. 393).
41 They argue that, under the assumption of imperfectly substitutable domestic and foreign assets,
devaluation triggers wage increases through the imported input channel that in turn augments credit demand,
therefore increasing domestic interest rates and depressing domestic output.
42 The validity of this link was questioned by Kenen(1967, pp. 52) himself. Investment depends, inter alia,
on the perception of the investors. If they perceive a decrease of external demand only as temporary, they might not
reduce domestic investment. However, it could also be the other way round.20
typically are thus assumed to be rather closed economies. This would allow for a flexible
exchange rate regime, as was stated in 3.2.2.2. This puzzle can be resolved by analyzing the
nature of the trade, inter- or intra-industry trade. A high degree of intra-industry trade will
conflict less with a high degree of openness of a large economy.
43
3.2.2.4  Similarity of Inflation Rates
Another relevant criterion for determining the optimality of a currency area is the
similarity of inflation rates. Although this criterion was less renowned in the traditional optimum
currency area theory it is subject to academic debate.
44 Take the two countries Argentina and
Brazil. Assume, labor productivity in Brazil is significantly higher than in Argentina, and
Brazilian unions are relatively weak. Thus, increased labor productivity is neither fully
translated into wage increases nor to the price level. Changes in the real exchange rate would
result; therefore increasing the pressure toward a nominal appreciation of Brazilian currency
versus the Argentinean one. Bilateral imbalances favoring Brazil would result. Under these
conditions the respective two countries would not represent ideal candidates for forming a
monetary union. The criterion of the similarity of inflation rates was introduced by
Haberler(1970) and by Fleming(1971, pp. 476). The latter identified three factors determining
the level of inflation: (1) similar objectives in national unemployment; (2) similar productivity
growth rates; (3) similarity of union behavior regarding wages. Not all of the three points have
to be fulfilled simultaneously. If one of these points is not fulfilled it might be compensated by
the other two points. For example, Brazil displays a significantly higher productivity growth rate
than Argentina. If the Argentinean unions proved to be less aggressive regarding their wage
claims, or the Argentinean government were inclined to accept increased rates of
unemployment, the relatively lower Argentinean productivity growth could be compensated for.
Traditional OCA theory offers additional criteria for analyzing currency areas that will
not be covered in depth here.
45 These are ‘Degree of Financial Integration’, which in part has
been covered by 3.2.2.1.1., and the ‘Degree of Policy Integration’. Tower and Willett(1976,
pp. 15) defined policy integration as the extent of agreement over the position on the Philips
Curve.
THESIS 5:  If optimum currency area criteria derived from the traditional
approaches to optimum currency area are not satisfied, it cannot be concluded that
the respective currency area is not optimal. The MERCOSUR countries do not, or
only to a limited extent, fulfill these criteria. Within the context of MERCOSUR
these criteria suffer serious caveats, theoretically as well as empirically.
3.2.3  The New OCA Theory
Traditional approaches to OCA theory presented in the previous section lost much of
their appeal, inter alia, due to their mistaken assumptions regarding the effectiveness of the
                                                
43 The findings of the ‘new’ trade theory, that not only goods are traded when a country possesses a
comparative advantage, but also that differentiated goods are traded (intra-industry trade) added a further aspect to
OCA theory. Countries possessing a high share of intra-industry trade are more likely to face a symmetrical shock,
since it is more probable that similar products will be affected by the same disturbance. Compare also 3.2.3.1.
44 While the previously listed criteria focus on adjustment to predominantly temporary disturbances the
latter criterion envisages rather permanent disturbances, for example lasting productivity shocks.
45 For an overview see Ishiyama(1975, pp. 354).21
exchange rate as an adjustment instrument and due to the fact that they took into account just a
limited range of shocks affecting an economy. Some of the traditional approaches did not
distinguish between a fixed exchange rate and a common currency. It was assumed that
economies could chose freely a point on the Philips curve. Different economic models were
employed. Two-country models rather than three-country models were applied. If two countries
were to join a monetary union, adjustment costs in terms of a fixed bilateral exchange rate
between these two countries were analyzed. It was not usually analyzed how adjustment of these
two countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world worked.
46
Besides these caveats other findings in economic theory have further questioned the
validity of the traditional approaches to OCA theory. The endogeneity of some of the OCA
criteria suggests that a non-optimal currency area can become one. In the developing/emerging
country context the endogeneity approach can be twofold. In the past, many of the
developing/emerging countries have been characterized, inter alia, by a series of asymmetrical
endogenous policy shocks. It may prove difficult in a group of developing/emerging countries
intending to create a monetary union to remove the source(s) these shocks. Only in a second step
the conventional discussion on the endogeneity of OCA criteria, as discussed in 3.2.3.2, will be
of importance. Time inconsistency literature demonstrated that a formerly high inflation
economy can join a monetary union with the objective of price stability without too much
adjustment cost. However, the question remains what to do, if none of the prospective monetary
union members can look back to a ‘conservative’ central bank policy. Does it make sense to
import credibility from somewhere else?
3.2.3.1  Endogeneity of the OCA Criteria
Dynamic considerations regarding the creation of a monetary union have been left out
until now. Suppose MERCOSUR, with Argentina and Brazil, achieved the stage of a common
market. All the car production would now – after a concentration process – be located in and
around Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. If the car sector faced an external demand shock, only the
two respective states would be affected. This industry-specific shock would be of an
asymmetrical nature, which had not been the case before this assumed concentration process.
This point was made by Krugman (1991).
47 However, considering developing countries,
regional concentration has to be considered in an additional context. In developing countries
with strong regional differences in terms of concentration the question has to be asked whether
concentration on the national scale is more important than concentration, and possible changes
of concentration, on the regional scale.
Empirically Krugman’s assumptions have not been confirmed. On the contrary, a small
number of empirical studies suggests that in the most recent undertaking of an economic and
monetary union project (EMU) the criterion of shock correlation exhibits endogeneity. Increased
trade integration resulted in an increase of intra-industry trade, augmenting the correlation of the
respective business cycles setting off (at least to a certain extent) emphasized asymmetrical
shocks, resulting from increased specialization in trade. Two examples are Frankel and
                                                
46 For the last point also compare Mèlitz(1995, p. 493). In addition, this article provides a critical view on
the traditional approaches to optimum currency area, as well as on the ‘new’ OCA theory.
47 Picking up the core-periphery issue Krugman(1991) models two regions, each disposing of a
manufacturing and an agricultural sector. Only the working force of the manufacturing sector can move. And only
manufactured goods face transportation costs. He confirms, analytically, that the region with the larger manufacture
sector will attract even more workers due to its, by tendency, higher nominal wages. Moreover, an additional effect
on real wages exists, since the larger market will offer relatively cheaper products. Opposing these trends is that
workers in the region with the smaller manufacture market will face less competition. Under the assumption of
either low transportation costs and/or economies of scale and/or a relatively large manufacturing sector the former
trend will dominate and attract even more workers to its manufacturing sector.22
Rose(1996) and Artis et al. (1999).
(1) Frankel and Rose(1996) regress the correlation of the business cycles on the degree
of openness finding a clearly positive correlation between the two variables. It is important,
however, to consider the time interval of the analyzed series. Economic data from 21  ‘old
industrial economies’, with emphasis on members of the European Union, from the year 1959 to
1993 was divided into four subsets of equal size. Thus, a relatively lengthy time span was
analyzed suggesting that the effects of increased trade integration and consequently the degree
of openness will take its time until it brings business cycles into a more equal pace. Moreover,
the study does not refer exclusively to the endogneity of the exchange rate regime, but also to
the effects of a deepening trade integration. The link between the effects of the exchange rate
regime, trade integration and business cycles is somewhat blurred. First, the exchange rate
regimes changed over the time period analyzed. Fixed exchange rates date back to the Bretton
Woods arrangement. Its abandonment was followed by an era of flexible exchange rates until
the European Monetary System was introduced in 1979. Thereafter exchange rate bands were in
operation until the members of Economic and Monetary Union fixed their exchange rates in
1998. Trade integration in the then European Economic Community started in 1959.
48 Trade
structure (assumedly) and the degree of openness started to change from the beginning of the
time series analyzed. Thus, the results of this study have to be seen in the context of changes in
the exchange rate regime and changes in the degree of trade integration.
(2) Artis et al. (1999) find, by the means of a time domain analysis, using three different
filter methods (centered seven-term-moving average, Hodrick-Prescott filter and an unobserved-
component model) that the cross correlation of 8 European Union members with Germany vis-
à-vis the US has increased after the implementation of the ERM. Frequency domain statistics
deliver similar results. This study, however, does not imply endogeneity of the business cycles
as does the foregoing one. It simply shows changes of the correlation of some business cycles
and their contribution to a single European business cycle.
Both studies analyze a very limited set of variables like the degree of openness and
variables indicating economic activity (GDP, industrial production and unemployment).
Disaggregated data delivering some information about the trade structure and how it changed
was not applied, although such a setting would have been even more interesting from the point
of view of OCA theory.
THESIS 6: Integration of trade will probably increase the degree of trade openness
and therefore lead to a higher degree of symmetry of shocks. In MERCOSUR the
customs union is not yet perfectly implemented, and it was created just several
years ago. With further trade integration, a further increase in intra-trade and less
asymmetrical shocks to the trading bloc are likely.
Nonetheless, evidence exists that a region, that before the start of an economic
integration project, was less of an optimum currency area can over time become one. This view
fundamentally changes the way optimum currency area is looked at. But even the latter
approach faces some limitations. It is unknown how fast trade structure and openness within a
                                                
48 The preliminary stage of tariff reductions following the Treaty of Rome went into operation in January
1959. Tariffs were reduced 10% and import quotas augmented 20% (Urwin, 1991, p. 85).23
monetary union will change. Further, it is uncertain which degree of trade integration (unilateral
reduction of tariffs, customs union, common market, etc.) will influence the degree of openness
and the change in trade structure most.
3.2.3.2  Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria, Monetary Union and the
Degree of Political Integration
Political affinity, if not to say unity, of potential members of any economic integration
scheme represents a prerequisite for successful integration projects. In most of the OCA
literature economics is strictly separated from political considerations. However, the findings
that OCA criteria can change endogenously, that is, they can be influenced by political
agreements deserves a brief analysis. The relevance of political integration for monetary union
can be illustrated by the following two scenarios.
(1) Supposing Argentina and Brazil, are not in the sense of the traditional OCA theory,
an optimal currency area due to either a limited degree of trade openness or due to more or less
frequent asymmetrical external shocks. A high degree of political cohesion between the two
economies prevails and economic integration deepens gradually from a customs union to a
common market over time without too many tensions, and a common political intention of
establishing a monetary union will exist. The potential members are formally disposed to
relinquish national sovereignty over monetary policy and will create supranational institutions
assuming the conduct of a common monetary policy.
(2) Assume that both countries now form a close to optimal currency area in the sense of
traditional OCA theory. However, economic integration has not deepened very much - it is stuck
in a customs union and no power has been deferred to supranational institutions - and a low
degree of political cohesion predominates the political arena. Although common agreement
regarding fixing the nominal exchange exists, political commitment seems to be at best
temporary and rather vague.
Even on intuitive grounds one would not bet, despite the optimality of the currency area,
on the second option being a good basis for the creation of a monetary union. Thus, it is essential
to include political considerations into the analysis, whilst thinking about the creation of a
monetary union. De Grauwe(1984) puts it even more stringently: „Therefore, it is utopian to
separate the problem of monetary union from political unification... Monetary union is an
essential part of political union.“
49
The proposition of accompanying monetary union by political union, since political
union serves as ‘adhesive’ for monetary union, is an appealing proposition. In practice this
would mean formerly sovereign nations would have to bundle up their political institutions to
one single entity foregoing national political sovereignty. The participants in EMU opted for an
intermediate concept: full monetary union and the centralizing of monetary authority to the
European Central Bank. Fiscal policy remained in national hands, although the Stability Pact
                                                
49 An in-depth analysis regarding political factors influencing the creation and continuity of monetary
unions can be found in Theurl(1992, pp. 291). Important theses are: (1) Political visions and their marketing are
essential in providing momentum to deepening integration. (2) Left sovereignty to the member states of an
integration scheme bears potential for intra-union conflicts, thus, jeopardizing a smooth continuance of an
integration project. (3) Money has never ceased to be political. (4) Missing coordination rules in the monetary
unions of the 19
th century, lead to the existence of temporary disequlibria, the infringement of agreements and also to
the dissolution of monetary unions. (5) Adjustment processes in past monetary unions often lead to the dissolution of
monetary unions based on inter-government institutions and international law.24
prescribes some fiscal rules for the EU members. If central banks of emerging countries were
judged on the basis of their institutional convergence many of them would have accelerated their
pace of increasing the degree of independence, constituting an important ingredient for
augmenting credibility for monetary policy and eventually providing the basis for further
convergence of monetary policy.
THESIS 9:  The establishment of a common central bank with the principle
objective of price level stability requires a bundle of rules and measures, inter alia,
the guarantee of the independence of the national central banks that represent the
predecessors of the common central bank. The central banks of the MERCOSUR
countries have already shown accelerating convergence in their degree of
independence in recent years.
3.2.3.3  Time Inconsistency, Stabilization and Monetary Union
The deliberate use of the exchange rate instrument in the absence of wage illusion is likely to
increase inflation. In addition, even negative effects on output are possible. In fact such
preconditions already limit the use of this policy tool. Furthermore, the time-inconsistency
literature demonstrates that economic agents apply optimal strategies as a response to the
strategic behavior of the authorities. Consequently, the private sector possesses the ability to
limit the effectiveness of discretionary policies by the authorities even more. The basic insight of
this approach is that a high inflation country can by pegging its exchange rate credibly to one of
a low inflation country reduce its inflation rate without too much cost in terms of unemployment
or contraction of output.
Usually three scenarios are modeled: (1) The authorities undertake policy actions in a
discretionary manner. Assume the Brazilian government decides to increase the inflation rate in
order to augment real economic activity. Since the private agents expect the Brazilian
government to do this, they will offset the resulting monetary expansion by increasing their
wage claims. The effect on the economic activity will be limited or null.
50 A possible reduction
of the real stock of the nominal debt will be frustrated, too. Seignorage gains, however, can be
obtained by the government. (2) The Brazilian authorities announce a rule for a fixed inflation
rate that is below the current one and they stick to it. Private agents believe the government.
There will be no loss in terms of a decreased economic activity or increased unemployment (mid
and long term) (3) The Brazilian authorities announce a rule, as they did in (2). Now, they
renege on the commitment and cheat the private agents by a unexpected inflation. Economic
activity will be increased in the short term and welfare will be the highest within this option.
Nonetheless, the loss in credibility is not taken into account. If the scenario of a repeated game is
introduced, a punishment function comes into play. Cheating the private agents is associated
with costs. The government has to take into account that by reneging its commitment it will not
be able to make the rule under (2) or (3) credible in the following period. The authorities know
that ”cheating cannot occur systematically” (Barro and Gordon, 1983, p. 113). Consequently
the government will weigh the costs of adopting a discretionary policy (enforcement) in the
future against the gains of cheating (temptation) with unexpected inflation. What the equilibrium
                                                
50 Some economists in the 60ies and 70ies (for instance, Tower and Willett, 1976, p. 26) supposed that the
unemployment-inflation trade-off was valid in the long run. Today every economic textbook shows that this trade-
off is valid only short term. Furthermore, a natural rate of unemployment is assumed which persists independently of
monetary disturbances. Changes in the natural rate over time are possible due to supply shocks, demographic
changes, changes in fiscal policy, etc.25
will be like depends on various factors: The higher the inflation rate is, that the rule describes,
the less costly the loss of reputation is. If inflation is not very costly the rate prescribed by the
rule has to be high.
51
The Barro-Gordon framework can be extended to the open economy by adding the real
exchange rate to the model (compare Giavazzi and Pagano, 1988). By credibly committing to an
exchange rate rule an economy can reduce its rate of inflation without incurring too much cost.
If an economy admits a relative increase in its rate of inflation, it will be punished anyway by an
appreciating real exchange rate. However the type of commitment to the exchange rate rule will
in the end influence on its credibility. “..., merely fixing the exchange rate does not solve the
problem, because the fixed exchange rate rule is no more credible than a fixed inflation rate
rule” (De Grauwe, 1992, p. 53). Examples, where this exchange rate rule lacked credibility are
numerous in the context of Latin American economies. Fixed exchange rate regimes often
suffered speculative attacks. Klein and Marion (1996) analyzed the duration of currency pegs in
a group of 17 mainly Latin American countries. The mean duration of a currency peg did not
exceed 32 months.
52 Thus, as the past shows (and empirical literature), simply pegging to
another exchange rate or to a basket will not deliver sufficient credibility. The possibility of a
Krugman-like or self-fulfilling prophecy-type attack will persist as long there is a fixed or a
close to fixed exchange rate one can speculate against. Thus, the instrument of a fixed exchange
rate would represent an instrument for temporary stabilization
53 of an economy rather than
considering such a solution for a durable exchange-rate union.
Thus, perfect credibility can only be achieved by the creation of a monetary union.
54 A
monetary authority, that formerly had the reputation of assigning much weight to
competitiveness/low unemployment, will be able to improve its reputation when entering a
monetary union that has inherited its reputation from a ‘conservative central banker’. Imagine
an economy with a floating exchange rate regime, a tight monetary policy in order to suppress
significant inflation expectations due to a not too distant hyperinflationary past. If such an
economy joined a monetary union as just described, it could not only reduce inflation credibly
but also relieve the interest burden on its external debt.
55 Such a decrease in the interest rate
                                                
51 Barro and Gordon (1983, p. 114) identify the following cases in which inflation is less costly: (1) in the
presence of high natural unemployment rate (2) during a recession (3) facing a huge real stock of nominally
denominated public debt.
52 As one key determinant for the giving up of the fixed exchange rate, they could identify real
appreciation. Another study by Martinez Peria(1997) demonstrates by means of a logit analysis that most forced
devaluations in Latin America are of a Krugman-type. Bad fundamentals, as, for instance, foreign reserves, current
account balance, domestic credit, overvalued exchange rates, etc. force the exchange rates out of fixity. The author,
however, failed in operationalizing the credibility variables. The number of exits during the last 12 months and the
durability in months of an exchange rate peg obviously do reflect the credibility effect only insufficiently. An
alternative measure would be the indication of a simple loss of competitiveness in terms of an overvalued exchange
rate. This condition obviously augments the likelihood of a future devaluation. Compare Agènor and Mélitz(1996,
pp. 196).
53 Exchange-rate based stabilization has often been implemented in Latin American economies, sometimes
successfully and occasionally this type of stabilization attempt was deemed to failure. The probability of success
augmented with the perceived commitment of the authorities to the rules and accompanying measures in the fiscal
area. For various analysis on stabilization attempts see, inter alia, Bruno et al.(1988).
54 A flexible exchange rate regime which is accompanied by consistent macroeconomic management can
be perfectly credible, too. Nonetheless, in this work the viability of monetary union for a set of developing/emerging
countries is analyzed.
55 Of course this does not apply to any debt level. If the debt level is too high, the interest rate also reflects
default risk, etc. This component, however, cannot be eliminated by a monetary union. Rather, if the high interest
rate results from inflation expectations, augmented credibility through the joining of a monetary union will likely
result into a reduced interest rate.26
would be advantageous for the case that interest payments relative to debt payments are high,
that is, a relatively low debt level.
In conclusion, an  ‘irrevocably fixed exchange rate’ ,as such, simply does not exist.
Nonetheless, a fixed exchange rate proves a valuable stabilization instrument by which, at least
over the short run, credibility can be ‘imported’. Only a monetary union-cum-unification of the
currency will deliver perfect credibility and consequently be close to costless disinflation. If
before joining a monetary union interest rates had been high, due to inflation expectations and,
interest payments of foreign debt relative to debt repayment had been high, positive effects on
the fiscal accounts may even occur.
3.2.3.4  The New OCA Theory in the Context of Developing/Emerging Countries
Endogeneity of the OCA criteria may be judged differently in the context of
developing/emerging countries. Continuous trade opening which tends to occur over several
cycles and the simultaneous application of a single currency presuppose political coherence and
economic cooperation, a constituent often lacking in developing/emerging countries.
Endogeneity should thus be considered from the point of view of the establishment and
sustainability of a common economic and monetary policy.
Time inconsistency in developing/emerging countries may acquire a different meaning
compared with developed industrialized countries, too. If a group of developing/emerging
countries wants to import credibility for its common central bank the question has to be
permitted where they should import it from, if none of the national central banks have sufficient
credibility.
3.2.3.4.1  Preconditions for Endogeneity
Take a group of developing/emerging countries, which in the past have been fairly
closed in terms of trade openness. Moreover, their economies are characterized by frequent
endogenous policy shocks (besides symmetrical and asymmetrical exogenous shocks that for the
current problem are of secondary order). If the argument of the endogeneity of the OCA criteria
should be applied to them at least two central aspects have to be taken into account. (1)
Although barriers to trade can be removed relatively fast, the adjustment of trade flows and trade
structure will take some time. (2) Endogeneity presumes stable and coherent policies of the
member states.
(1) Economies that formerly were relatively closed and that employed import-
substitution programs will, despite having rapidly removed their barriers to trade, require some
time to change their trade structure. Industries will have to adapt in order to compete on a
regional scale and possibly on a global scale. Not only the structure of trade but also the level of
trade flows will most likely increase. As a result fundamental equilibria are also likely to change.
The direction of change cannot be predicted from the beginning. Therefore, some adjustment
valves have to be provided until the new equilibria are established. It cannot be ruled out that at
a transitional stage of an economic and monetary union the exchange rate mechanism provides
an apt adjustment mechanism until the new equilibria are reached.
(2) The finding, that OCA criteria are endogenous, could be of a mixed blessing for
developing/emerging countries. Many developing/emerging countries look back to a long period
of negative endogenous policy shocks that resulted either from economic mismanagement or
from subsequent stabilization attempts. This has several consequences for judging whether a
group of developing/emerging countries forms an OCA or can become one. (a) If the respective
countries are capable of successfully stabilizing their economies and capable of maintaining
relatively consistent macroeconomic policies at a national level, an important source of27
asymmetrical endogenous shocks can be removed, thus, rendering these countries more optimal
for a common currency area.
56 (b) From an empirical point of view, the analysis of past shocks
will be of little value, if the present and the future are characterized by more stable and
consistent macroeconomic policies. In the past the cycles of these countries were superimposed
by rather unpredictable endogenous policy shocks. If it is technically difficult or impossible to
separate the endogenous policy shocks from the resting shocks the indicated analysis will be of
little use.
57 Further, the judgement, whether cycles have converged or not due to economic and
monetary integration efforts; the economy needs to have run through a series of cycles under, at
best, a similar policy setting. (c) Assume formerly closed economies, that applied import-
substitution programs and adhered to the ‘hypothesis of conflict’ in order to be independent from
the rest of the world, may find it relatively difficult to turn to more cooperative policy schemes.
Firstly, they might have to concentrate on consolidating their formerly unstable economic and
monetary policies. Secondly, they will have to establish a framework for new rules of
cooperation. It will take time to negotiate and subsequently implement this framework. (d) In a
similar way the reasoning goes that there is a long way from economic cooperation to setting up
common political entities with common policy objectives. It will require less of an effort to
agree on common central bank standards with regards to credibility of monetary policy than, for
instance, cede sovereign rights to a supranational common central bank.
To conclude: there has to be a strong political will and strong political consensus for
providing the necessary political-economical framework for successfully affecting OCA criteria,
that is, providing stable, consistent and lasting common trade policies or even monetary policies
in order to make cycles converge and render the respective region a more optimal currency area
than it was before the application of the regional liberalization measures.
3.2.3.4.2  Import of Credibility for a Common Central Bank of a Group of Developing/Emerging
Countries
If a group of developing/merging countries decides to form a monetary union, usually
none of their members can look back to a history of credibly pursued monetary policies. Thus,
the benefit for one developing country to import the credibility of one another is likely to be low.
The probability is low that one of the members has a long record as a ‘conservative’ central
banker that deserves tying one's hands to.
58
A relatively intuitive answer to this problem would be tying the member countries hands
that presumably face a credibility problem, to a  ‘conservative’ central banker outside the
prospective monetary union. The probability is high that such a set-up would result in an
                                                
56 In fact, the Brazilian maxi-devaluation seems worthy of discussion in the context of endogeneity. Under
the assumption that large fiscal deficits resulted from economic mismanagement and the current account deficit from
an overvalued currency that gave impetus to the maxi-devaluation, at least the large fiscal deficit could have been
avoided by proper economic management without altering the exchange rate regime. Maybe the devaluation would
not have occurred under a more convergent and consistent economic policy, e.g. more convergent fiscal policies. It
seems to be – at least to some extent – as if the provision of a stable macroeconomic environment itself would render
a currency area more optimal. One could speak, so to say, of a twofold endogeneity: one resulting, from trade
opening and converging monetary policy, or one resulting from a stabilized economic environment.
57 Further, it has to be taken into account that liberalization will change the behavior of the respective
economies as well rendering again the analysis of past shocks less valuable.
58 In the context of EMU the example of Germany and Italy is often given (compare, inter alia, De Grauwe,
1992, pp. 52). The German central bank has a reputation as a ‘conservative’ central bank and the Italian central bank
has a reputation as willing to inflate its currency bases for easing unemployment contrary to the German central
bank. By the establishment of a European common central bank, Italy will benefit by importing the credibility of the
German central bank without suffering too large adjustment costs.28
asymmetrical monetary or exchange-rate union.
59 An asymmetrical monetary union may bring
about higher credibility but at the same time exit may be more difficult, in case the monetary
union proves to be non-optimal for the member countries. An exchange-rate union makes exit
easier but may at the same time be less credible. It can, for instance, become subject to exchange
rate speculations.
Closer to reality is - that if a group of developing/emerging countries is considered - that
one of these countries (country A) has already tied its hands to a conservative central banker
(country U) outside the prospective monetary union (for instance, for reasons of stabilizing the
economy) and other developing/emerging countries of that prospective union have not (country
B). At least two options become viable (1) A and U maintain the exchange-rate union and B
joins the exchange-rate union and subsequently A and B enter a monetary union with U. Since U
is assumedly a large economic entity, which is not interested ceding national sovereignty to a
group of developing/emerging countries, the monetary union remains asymmetrical. (2a) A and
U step back from the exchange-rate union. A credibility loss for A and thus a currency crisis
may result.
60 A and B may gradually try to build up the credibility of their national central banks
and then form a monetary union. (2b) Country A exits from the exchange-rate union with U.
Subsequently A and B establish a band with a currency basket representing the weights of their
most important trading partners, thus, importing credibility by this means, and as a third step
form a monetary union with a common central bank. In this case the credibility loss of A when
exiting the exchange-rate union with U, may be less severe since A and also B immediately
enter into a new exchange-rate arrangement, possibly rendering increased credibility. However,
the peg to a currency basket may be subject to exchange rate speculations at least in the medium
                                                
59 Examples for an asymmetrical exchange rate union would be the CFA-Franc zone (Boughton, 1991). In
the dollar region, for a more institutionalized exchange rate union, the Argentinean currency board and for an
asymmetrical monetary union, inter alia, Panama can be mentioned.
60 From the point of view of herd behavior it has to be asked whether the exit of country A from monetary
union really bears such a high cost (in terms of a resulting currency crisis). A less then perfectly credible peg does
not protect against speculative pressure resulting from heard behavior resulting from a currency crisis, for example,
from the currency crisis of a neighbor country. This may provide the argument for a symmetrical and at least a
cooperative if not common monetary and exchange-policy for the affected region.29
term.
61
                                                
61 For a similar discussion see also Eichengreen(1998).30
4  Empirical Analysis of MERCOSUR
In the three previous theoretical chapters a total of 7 theses were derived. The objective
of this chapter is the empirical consideration of these theses. The order of the theses corresponds
to the theses presented in the previous chapters.
4.1  Avoiding a Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Policy
THESIS 1: A common currency avoids beggar-thy-neighbor policies in terms of
competitive devaluations vis-à-vis other monetary union members. The maxi-
devaluation of Brazil in January 1999 caused considerable economic cost for the
rest of MERCOSUR, that by the theoretical existence of a common currency, could
have been avoided.
In the past exchange rate devaluations proved to be traumatic in particular in developing
countries in Latin America (Edwards, 1989, p. 2). Devaluations were often accompanied by, or
were the consequence of, political upheaval. Finance ministers had to resign or even
governments as a whole had to resign. Due to its high political cost, even in the presence of large
macroeconomic disequilibria, governments resisted devaluation. This argument also holds true
for Brazil during the period of the Real Plan. Nevertheless, in the past devaluations were
evaluated on their internal cost rather than on their possible effects on neighbor countries,
specifically with respect to developing countries. The membership of Brazil in MERCOSUR,
however, demands a different perspective than the internal cost side on the Brazilian maxi-
devaluation in January 1999. The political cost of the devaluation will briefly be discussed, as
well as, the question of its economic cost will be treated, in terms of the behavior of aggregate
trade variables.
62
4.1.1  Political Cost
In 2.1 the point was made that pronounced exchange rate swings would alert political
pressure groups representing the exporting industries of the affected countries. Political reactions
in Argentina were alike. Soon after the devaluation had occurred representatives, from the
Argentinean Industrial Union and various political parties pushed, for compensatory measures in
order to provide some protection for the most likely affected sectors; like rice, chicken,
processed pork, automobiles (car, car bodies and tractors), dairy products, shoe manufacture,
textiles and chemicals (Clarin, 1999a; Clarin, 1999b).
Interestingly the representatives of the export industry did not press for the abandonment
of the Argentinean currency board in favor of a flexible exchange rate regime. In Argentina
regardless of the political party and the economic sector, the consensus on the maintenance of
the fixed parity of the peso vis-à-vis the US dollar was very broad. The pressure groups asked
for the use of other instruments rather than a change in the exchange rate. The demanded
instruments ranged from the application of tariffs, a stop of Brazilian subsidies to Brazilian
                                                
62 For a more detailed analysis of the economic cost of the Brazilian devaluation, including the presentation
of stylized facts of the devaluation, the behavior of various trade sector variables and the induces uncertainty by the
devaluation see Kronberger(2001a).31
exporters, the voluntary application of taxes on Brazilian imports, to temporary restrictions on
imports by the means of quotas (Burgueño, 1999).
63
The Argentinean government decided to introduce the instrument of the  ‘previous
permission’ on 1,200 Brazilian products - all of them pertaining to sensitive sectors (Clarin,
1999c). Brazilian imports had to be registered at the Argentinean border and were monitored
carefully. Other measures that would provide compensation on a more general basis could not
be agreed on. Arising sector imbalances had to be negotiated on a case by case basis. Often the
outcome was unsatisfactory for both parties leading to severe political tensions between the two
governments (Peña, 1999). These tensions built up to a full blown trade war between the two
large economies. The severity of these tensions can be judged on the grounds of selected
announcements of the respective government officials.
The Brazilian government officially announced that it was revising three possible
attitudes toward the prevailing trade war; (1) abandon the customs union; (2) leave the things as
they are, that is, continuation of the trade war; (3) deepening of the integration scheme (Ambito
Financiero, 2000).
Nonetheless, the discussion was not only geared toward indirect measures concerning
the relative price competitiveness of Argentinean and Brazilian products. Tensions between the
large countries also arose in the monetary policy field. The Treaty of Asuncion does not provide
any regulation regarding macroeconomic coordination.
64 This loose cooperation turned out to be
a boomerang for the MERCOSUR countries in the presence of the Brazilian maxi-devaluation.
As any other country outside the customs union, the MERCOSUR countries learned about the
decision of the Brazilian government to devalue from news papers.
65 The extremely reserved
information policy of the Brazilian authorities, and the intent of Argentinean officials to suggest
monetary and fiscal policy measures for the Brazilian government led to distress. Inter alia, the
implementation of a debt conversion scheme similar to the Argentinean BONEX plan
66 or the
implementation of a currency board for Brazil were proposed by Argentinean representatives.
These suggestions were immediately dismissed by Brazilian officials. The Brazilians
themselves, criticized the Argentinean idea of a complete dollarization of the Argentinean
economy. The official Brazilian view was that a complete dollarization of the Argentinean
economy would be the end of MERCOSUR.
To conclude, the maxi-devaluation of Brazil culminated in a trade war, specifically 
between the two large MERCOSUR economies Argentina and Brazil. For Argentina the policy
instruments at its disposal were strongly limited. Neither the exchange rate instrument could be
used, inter alia, due to the common (Argentinean) consensus of no devaluation at any cost and
the stipulation of the currency board in the Argentinean constitution nor could tariffs be imposed
on Brazilian imports without violating the agreement on the weakly institutionalized customs
union.
                                                
63 Clearly the Argentinean government discarded the application of tariffs, since it obviously contradicted
the spirit of the customs union.
64 A loose exchange of statistical data and meetings within SWG 10 exists.
65 On 13 January 1999 the Argentinean press was still talking about rumors concerning a possible
devaluation of the real vis-à-vis other currencies (Ambito Financiero, 1999a). The following day, the public as well
as the officials of the MERCOSUR countries, were confronted by the facts without prior information (Gerschenson,
1999).
66 The Bonex Plan represents a debt rescheduling program adopted in one of the previous stabilization
attempts in Argentina (Almansi and Rodriguez, 1997). It converted domestic debt to convertible debt that was
denominated in US dollar.32
4.1.2  Economic Cost
Productivity and bilateral trade will be looked at as one, since the effect of the foregoing
recession and the devaluation on trade cannot be clearly separated. Diagram  4-1 shows the
evolution of the bilateral real/USD exchange rate deflated by the consumer price index (CPI).
The drop in the exchange rate was largest in the period from December to February, where the
decrease in the exchange rate equaled 62.9%. In July the real had again appreciated (since
December the real had overall appreciated by a total of 40,88%). In December 1999, the real
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Diagram 4-1: Brazil: Evolution of the real/US dollar
exchange rate adjusted for the CPI
Source: Central bank of Brazil, Brasilia; Instituto Brasileiro
de Geografia e Estatística/IBGE, Rio de Janeiro
Diagram  4-2 and Diagram  4-3 show the evolution of the Argentinean and Brazilian
gross domestic product (GDP) and industrial production. According to these indicators both
countries entered recession in the third quarter of 1998, but the Argentinean GDP started to
decrease in the fourth quarter). Negative growth rates of these indicators can be observed up to
the end of the third quarter of 1999.33
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Change of GDP Change of Industrial Production
Diagram 4-2: Argentina: Change of GDP and industrial production 1997-1999
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional,
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires
Brazil





























































































Change of GDP Change of Industrial Production
Diagram 4-3: Brazil: Change of GDP and industrial production 1997-1999
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Comercio Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires
The analysis of the Argentinean trade balance, once vis-à-vis the rest of the world
(ROW) and once vis-à-vis Brazil confirms that both effects – recession and devaluation –
supposedly had a significant influence on the trade balance.
Argentinean imports (ROW) dropped 22.6% within one year, whereas exports decreased
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Diagram 4-4: External trade of Argentina and Brazil with
the rest of the world
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires
The bilateral trade balance between Argentina and Brazil shows a somewhat different
picture. Argentinean imports dropped 24.4%, and Argentinean exports dropped 34.2%. The
bilateral trade balance had worsened, contrary to the trade balance vis-à-vis the ROW. In July
1998 Brazilian exports to Argentina accounted for 703 million US dollars and almost halved by
January 1999 (386 million US dollars). From January to September 1999 Brazilian exports
increased by less than 100 million US dollars to 469 million US dollars (see Diagram  4-5).
Thus, the first nine months of the new exchange rate regime in Brazil did not bring about the
feared flooding of the Argentinean market by exports originating from Brazil.
Jan        Feb        Mar          Apr         May         Jun        Jul         Aug        Sep         Oct         Nov        Dec
Argentinean Imports from Brazil
In million US dollars
Diagram 4-5: Argentinean imports from Brazil 1998/99
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Comercio Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires
Moreover, Brazilian exports, as a share of total Argentinean imports, oscillated between
20.3% and 23.6% between January 1998 and September 1999. A somewhat more marked low is
recognizable in the first quarter of 1999, that might be due to the recession (see Diagram 4-6).35
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Diagram 4-6: Brazilian share in Argentinean imports
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Comercio Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires
From October 1998 to December 1998 Argentinean exports to Brazil decreased from
768 million US dollar to 589 million US dollars (-23.3%). From December 1998 to January
1999 exports declined a further 31.91%. From January 1999 to September 1999 exports
increased by 25.93% to a monthly volume of 505 million US dollars. Again, almost half of the
decline in Argentinean exports to Brazil occurred in the last quarter of 1999 (see Diagram 4-7).
Thus, the drop in exports is explained, inter alia, by the foregoing recession. The changes of
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Diagram 4-7: Argentinean exports to Brazil
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Comercio Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires
The share of Argentinean exports to Brazil relative to total exports showed a sharp
decline from 33.4% in September 1998 to approximately 21% in April 1999. Until September
1999 it recovered to 27%. Again, the decrease in exports had already started in the fourth quarter
of 1998 and as a consequence cannot be attributed exclusively to the change of relative prices
between Argentina and Brazil. Assumedly the decrease on the export side was prolonged by the
change in competitiveness.36
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Diagram 4-8: Brazilian share  in Argentinean exports
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
Comercio Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires
The evolution of the monthly bilateral trade balance might allow for the conclusion that
the low in March 1999 was also helped by the change of relative competitiveness. However, it
cannot be deduced from the timing alone, that the change of relative prices was the only
explaining factor for the negative monthly trade balance in the first quarter of 1999. It had
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Millions of US dollars
Diagram 4-9: Monthly bilateral trade balance Argentina-Brazil
source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio
Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires37
4.2  The Effectiveness of Exchange Rate Devaluations
THESIS 2: In the past devaluations of Latin American currencies often proved to
be highly ineffective. Under the assumption that devaluations continue to be
ineffective a single currency would not impose costs on the single member countries
in terms of the loss of an adjustment instrument. Nonetheless, the Brazilian maxi-
devaluation of January 1999 showed a relatively high degree of effectiveness until
12:1999.
In the past Latin American economies frequently adhered to the use of the exchange rate
instrument for adjustment. It was discussed earlier that devaluations undertaken in Latin
American economies were frequently of little effectiveness.
67 Gains in competitiveness were
eroded relatively quickly due to high levels of inflation and/or due to the increased importance
of imported inputs for the price level. However, the Brazilian maxi-devaluation of January 1999,
that was accompanied by a change of the exchange rate regime from an asymmetrical exchange
rate band to managed floating, does not show such clear signs of erosion.
Applying the effectiveness index to the recent Brazilian devaluation renders the
devaluation of January 1999 relatively effective, as far as this can be judged after just a year







= index   ess effectiven ( 4-1 )
Two time series were applied,  effectiveness  index1 (08:1994 – 12:1999), from the
introduction of the Real Plan, until 1 year after the devaluation, and effectiveness index2
(01:1999 – 12:1999), from the devaluation until eleven months after.
effectiveness index1 = 0.379 ( 4-2 )
effectiveness index2 = 0.84 ( 4-3 )
In the latter case only 16% of the devaluation was eroded. If the real appreciation during
the real Plan period were taken into account, the maxi-devaluation discounted for the mini-
devaluations, the effectiveness would still have been equal to 40%. Based on these numbers the
Brazilian maxi-devaluation cannot be judged as ineffective as this was the case for many Latin
American economies in the seventies and in the eighties (Edwards, 1989). Nonetheless, it has to
be taken into account that only a period of 12 months following the devaluation was considered
for the computation of the effectiveness index.
68,69
Besides imported inputs, rigid real wages tend to have a negative impact on the
                                                
67 Many of the traditional approaches to OCA theory claim exchange-rate devaluations to be effective.
68 Edwards(1989) analyzed periods of 3 years.
69 As predicted by the Dornbusch model the devaluation was accompanied by a clearly noticeable
overshooting effect.38
effectiveness of devaluations. Minimum wage data
70 from the first 10 months after the
devaluation shows some real wage flexibility downwards. Nominal minimum wage increased
by 4.6%. Nominal minimum wages, deflated by the general price index, decreased by 8.4%, and
nominal minimum wages, deflated by the cost of living index, decreased by 1.8%. Therefore,
real minimum wages decreased far less than the nominal exchange rate, and exhibit rigidity.
71
4.3  Differences in Productivity and the Real Exchange Rate
THESIS 3: Differences in productivity combined with inflexible real wages might
require the exchange rate instrument for adjustment over the long run. These
preconditions apply to MERCOSUR.
In 3.1 the point was made that in the long run productivity changes have to be balanced
by the means of wage adjustment. It is shown in 4.5.2.2 that wages are relatively rigid in the
MERCOSUR countries. Marginal productivity rates as suggested in the model were not
available for the MERCOSUR countries over a longer period. Instead the only available
productivity variable was real GDP per capita (1960-1998) and GDP adjusted by PPP in USD
72
(1975-1998). Per-capita GDP is highest in Argentina and Uruguay (6,716 USD and 6,058 USD
respectively in 1998). Brazil is intermediate with 4,413 USD and Paraguay exhibits the lowest
product of 2,194 USD in 1998. The average annual growth rate for real GDP per capita from
1975 to 1998 has been highest for Uruguay (1.43%), followed by Paraguay (1.20%), Brazil
(0.96%) and Argentina (0.43%) (see Table 4-1). In the subperiod from 1991 to 1998 - coincident
with the existence of MERCOSUR - growth figures were subject to considerable changes.
Annual average growth accounted for 3.41% in Argentina, 3.04% in Uruguay, 1.21% in Brazil
and 0.28% in Paraguay.
GDP adjusted to purchase power parity in USD does not change the observed patterns
with respect to real GDP per capita. Over the whole period from 1975 to 1998 nominal growth
was 8.0% in Paraguay, 6.72% in Brazil, 6.15% in Uruguay and 5.92% in Argentina. In the
MERCOSUR period the Argentinean economy grew on average 6.01%, Uruguay 5.32% and
relative decelerations can be observed in Brazil with an annual growth rate of 4.41% and in
Paraguay of 3.68%.
A limited insight can be gained from the analysis of the data provided in Table 4-1. The
growth differences measured in real GDP per capita have widened significantly in the
MERCOSUR period relative to the large 1975-1998 period. Not only the data provided in Table
4-1 reveals that marked structural breaks in the growth paths are at play. It is also shown in
literature
73 that in the nineties, growth in Latin American countries increased relative to the
                                                
70 Average wage data would be more adequate as an indicator but this data was not available.
71 Although the Brazilian devaluation was relatively successful in terms of the effectiveness indicator by
Edwards(1989), effects on the fiscal balances were not taken into account. Large parts of the Brazilian public debt is
indexed in US dollars, thus, increasing the relative cost of servicing its debt.
72 The below cited numbers are all drawn from the Global Development Network Growth Database
(Worldbank). Although real GDP would have been more desirable it was not provided by the World Bank. Instead
the adjustment of GDP to PPP in USD had to be taken. It allows for the comparison between the respective
countries. Nonetheless, since Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay were highly inflationary economies it cannot be taken
for sure that all distortions were eliminated by this relatively aggregate adjustment operator.
73 For a small survey on economic growth and liberalization see Edwards(1997, pp. 119).39
eighties (the lost decade) due to the implementation of a set of reforms; among them trade
liberalization. Brazil has the most developed and largest industry but still lags behind Argentina
and Uruguay. Under the assumption of further convergence between industrialized and less
industrialized regions in Brazil, its overall productivity should increase further relative to
Argentina and Uruguay in the future. When analyzing GDP at current market prices, over the
longer observation period, it becomes evident that Brazil is on average growing faster than
Argentina and Uruguay. In the MERCOSUR period, however, this pattern has reversed. The
slower Brazilian growth performance in this period is also explained by the later implementation
of its stabilization program, the Real Plan, relative to the earlier implementations of the
Argentinian Convertibility Plan and the Uruguayan stabilization programs. The difference,
between the fastest and the slowest growth rate has also widened for GDP adjusted to PPP in
USD in the MERCOSUR period relative to the whole observation period. For both real GDP per
capita and GDP adjusted to PPP in USD the growth differences increased by approximately
50% in the MERCOSUR period.
To conclude, growth performance and thus productivity is far from convergent in the
MERCOSUR economies. Over the long run increased wage flexibility compared to now will be
needed to compensate for productivity differences.













to PPP in USD –
geom. average
1991-1998
Argentina (1) 0.43% 3.41% 5.92% 6.01%
Brazil (2) 0.96% 1.21% 6.72% 4.41%
Paraguay (3) 1.20% 0.28% 8.08% 3.68%





1.05% 1.98% 6.71% 4.85%
Growth difference
(highest-lowest) (6) 1.00% 3.13% 2.16% 2.33%
Growth difference
relative to average
(7) = (6)-(5) 0.05% 1.58% 0.32% 0.48%
Table 4-1: Annual growth rates of the MERCOSUR countries
Source: own calculations based on the Global Development Network Growth Database, World Bank,
Washington D.C.
4.4  Symmetry of Recent External Shocks to Latin American Economies
THESIS 4: The cost of a single currency will be lower, the more symmetrical the
shocks to the member countries occur. Since the creation of MERCOSUR external
shocks to the economies occurred rather symmetrically, except the effects of the
Brazilian maxi-devaluation in January 1999, which can be viewed as endogenous
shock.
Hoffmaister and Roldos(1996) estimate a structural vector autoregression model
(SVAR) on a group of 15 Asian and 17 Latin American economies with annual observations
from 1970 to 1993.
74 They use a more complex set of restrictions than Blanchard and
                                                
74 Besides the 4 MERCOSUR countries Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, the countries Bolivia,40
Quah(1989) do. Besides that aggregate demand shocks do not have a permanent effect on output
(as in Blanchard and Quah, 1989), fiscal shocks do not affect the level of aggregate GDP.
Further, exogenous and endogenous variables are distinguished. They are restricted in such a
way that external variables like world interest rates and the terms of trade are not affected by
endogenous variables like domestic output, the real exchange rate and the price level. Finally,
innovations are assumed to be orthogonal. They find that compared to the Asian countries
interest rate shocks in Latin American countries are much more important. Shocks to the interest
rates explain 20% of GDP fluctuations compared to 5% in the Asian countries. 
Carrera et al.(1999) follow the methodology of Hoffmaister and Roldos(1996). They use
 quarterly time series from 1980 to 1996 for Argentina and Brazil that are X-11 filtered. They
use a set of four variables: A shock to the interest rate is interpreted as external supply shock, to
the terms of trade as international demand shock, to GDP as a domestic supply shock and to the
inflation rate as a domestic demand shock. Contrary to Blanchard and Quah(1989) demand
shocks are allowed to have a permanent effect on GDP. Their results were as follows:
The variance decomposition for Argentina indicates that fluctuations of the GDP are
explained by interest rate shocks (38%) and by terms of trade shocks (5.14%) in the long run.
The total external shocks (43.14%) to the system are more important than domestic supply
shocks (40.64%). Fluctuations in the Argentinean inflation rate are explained by inflation itself
(80%). Fluctuations in the Brazilian GDP are explained to a lesser extent by interest rate
(external supply) shocks (6.23%) and terms of trade (external demand) shocks (11.96%).
Compared to Argentina, international demand shocks have an impact twice as large as supply
shocks. Brazil is much less receptive to interest rate shocks than Argentina. Domestic supply
shocks – they explain 75.51% of the fluctuations in Brazilian GDP - are most important.
Fluctuations in the inflation rate are explained  by changes of the inflation rate itself (86.74%).
As described in  0 the application of a vector-error-correction model does not only estimate
short-term equations but also delivers a long-term relationship of the system variables. This is
true, not only for the Engle-Granger methodology, but also for the Johansen methodology.
Carrera et al.(1999, p. 50) computed the following long term relationships for Argentina and
Brazil.
GDPARG  = 23.9 – 0.07 CPI – 1.87 iINT + 0.36 TOT ( 4-4 )
GDPBRA = 15.03 – 0.005 CPI – 1.19 iINT + 0.58 TOT ( 4-5 )
Equations ( 4-4 ) and ( 4-5 ) show that a rise in inflation (CPI) had an almost negligible
negative effect on the GDP of the respective countries. The elasticity between the Argentinean
GDP and the international interest rate iINT was approximately 50% higher than the one between
the Brazilian GDP and the international interest rate. In both countries the sign was negative,
that is, a rise in the interest rate caused a decline in the GDP. A rise in the terms of trade (TOT)
was 60% more beneficial to Brazil than to Argentina. The findings of Carrera et al.(1999)
confirm that the two large MERCOSUR countries are receptive to external shocks over the
terms of trade channel and over the international interest rate channel. The impact of shocks to
these variables on the respective products differed in the two countries.
Caveats of the time-series-model approaches applied in the before mentioned studies are
discussed in 4.5.1. The time series applied to the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition in 4.5.1 and
in Carrera et al.(1999) do not include the period after 1996. From the point of view of external
                                                                                                                                           
Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela
figure in their set of Latin American countries.41
shocks this time period is important. Although it covers the Mexican crisis, which occurred in
1994/95, it omits the Asian and the Russian crisis which had significant impacts on the
MERCOSUR economies.
75 In brief, stylized facts of the effects of these three external shocks on
the MERCOSUR countries will be presented. The brief analysis was limited by the
consideration of international reserves, real domestic credit and industrial production due to the
availability of quarterly data. The real domestic credit variable was chosen due to the
assumption that the Mexican crisis induced a liquidity crisis, at least in Argentina. Consequently
high domestic interest rates and a decrease in real domestic credit should proceed decreases in
production. The international reserves variable was analyzed due to the assumption that a high
degree of external short-term capital is placed in the MERCOSUR countries. If foreign investors
perceive higher risk for their short-term investment, for example, due to herd behavior they
would either expect higher interest rates and/or withdraw their capital from the country.
International reserve losses would be the consequence.
4.4.1  The Mexican Crisis
The Mexican crisis was preceded by an increase of the US-American short-term interest
rate by the Fed in the beginning of 1994. Capital inflows diminished, the Mexican economy
showed first signs of contraction, and the current account worsened. Finally, on 20 December


















































































































































































Diagram 4-10: MERCOSUR: Development of international reserves minus gold (1l.d)
Source: International Financial Statistics (IFS), International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C., various editions
In Argentina
77 the fourth quarter of 1994 was characterized by a contraction of domestic
credits (see Diagram 4-11).
78 Significant outflows of international reserves followed in the first
quarter of 1995 (Diagram 4-10). The impact on the real side was greatest in the subsequent
quarter. Within three months the Argentinean industrial production declined 6.78% (see
Diagram 4-12). In Brazil the contagion occurred first via the financial channel. Domestic credit
                                                
75 It was also mentioned earlier that the time series provided in the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
exhibit several breaks, inter alia the GDP. Consequently the less methodical approach of the description of some
stylized facts had to be chosen.
76 For a more detailed analysis of the Mexican crisis see, inter alia, Damill et al.(1996) and Calvo and
Mendoza(1996).
77 Numerous works analyze the effects of the Mexican crisis on the Argentinean economy. See, for
instance, Arnaudo(1995), Catão(1997), Eduardo et al.(1997), Damil and Frenkel(1997), and Rozenwurzel and
Bleger(1996).
78 The three vertical lines in the respective diagrams represent the beginnings of the Mexican, Asian and
Russian Crisis.42
slowed its growth in the third quarter of 1994.
79 International reserves started to decline in the
forth quarter. As in Argentina the effects of the Mexican crisis  could be felt on the real
economy in the second quarter of 1995. The Brazilian industrial production index ceded –7.83%
in the second quarter and –5.03%. in the third quarter. In Paraguay losses of international
reserves were minor and it is questionable whether these losses are attributable to the Mexican
crisis. Real domestic credit slowed its growth in the first quarter of 1995 and declined in the two
subsequent quarters. Industrial production data for Paraguay was not available. Uruguay’s
international reserves showed a weak decline in the second quarter of 1995. Real domestic credit
slowed its growth in the first quarter of 1995 and decreased in the following three quarters.
Industrial production measured by the IVF (Indice de Valor Fisico/Physical Value Index)
declines according to the seasonally adjusted index in the fourth quarter of 1994 and also in the
first quarter of 1995.
D DRES (11.d) D DRCREDIT (32) D DPROD
Country
94:3 94:4 95:1 95:2 95:3 94:3 94:4 95:1 95:2 95:3 94:3 94:4 95:1 95:2 95:3
Argentina - + - + + + - - + - + + - - -
Brazil + - - - + + + + + + + + + - -
Paraguay - + - + + + + + - - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Uruguay - + + - + + + - - - + - - + -
Table 4-2: Behavior of selected variables in MERCOSUR during the Mexican crisis
Source: International Financial Statistics /IFS, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.; Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean/ECLAC, Santiago de Chile; Instituto Nacional de
Estadística/INE, Montevideo; Secretaria Administrativa del MERCOSUR, Montevideo
Table 4-2 provides an overview of the changes of the before described variables one
quarter before and three quarters after the Mexican crisis occured. All four countries suffer
reserve losses (see gray fields in  Table  4-2) indicating short-term capital outflows that
supposedly resulted in contractions of real domestic credit (except in Brazil). The effect on
industrial production was strongest in Argentina and Brazil. In Argentina the contraction of
industrial production lagged behind the financial variables. In Brazil the slowdown in industrial
production lagged behind the decrease in reserves. In Diagram 4-18 and Diagram  4-19 large
shocks to the domestic interest rates become evident for the two large countries. Lags are not as
clearly visible in the two smaller countries, Paraguay and Uruguay, as they are in the two larger
MERCOSUR economies. Nonetheless, the evidence is strong that signs in the financial and real
variables reflect the impact of the Mexican crisis on all four MERCOSUR countries.
4.4.2  The South East Asian Crisis
Less than three years passed before the MERCOSUR economies were subject to the next
exogenous shock. On 22 October 1997 the collapse of the Hong-Kong-stock exchange initiated
the South East Asian crisis. Several South-East Asian countries had to devalue.
                                                
79 With respect to Brazil it has to be born in mind that the Brazilian economy was affected by the
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Diagram 4-11: MERCOSUR: Development of log difference of real domestic credit (32)
Source: International Financial Statistics/IFS, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.;
Secretaría Administrativa del MERCOSUR, Montevideo
The signs of the change in the variables international reserves and industrial production
tend to confirm the negative effect of the Asian crisis on Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (see
Table 4-3). Real domestic credit did not decrease in either country except in Paraguay from the
second quarter of 1998 on. In Uruguay the effect on international reserves, as well as on real
domestic credit, seems to be unimportant (see Diagram 4-10). There does not seem to be a clear
cut lag between the loss of reserves and a decrease in production regarding Argentina and
Brazil. A considerable interest rate hike in Brazil, and less so Argentina, resulted (see Diagram
4-18 and Diagram 4-19 in 0). Thus, the South East Asian crisis can also be perceived as a
relative symmetrical exogenous shock, which affected all MERCOSUR countries - less notably
Uruguay.
Country D DRES (11.d) D DRCREDIT (32) D DPROD
97:3 97:4 98:1 98:2 98:3 98:4 97:3 97:4 98:1 98:2 98:3 98:4 97:3 97:4 98:1 98:2 98:3 98:4
Argentina - + - + + + + + + + + + + + - + - -
Brazil + - + + - - + + + + + + + - - + - -
Paraguay - - - + - + + + + - - - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Uruguay + + + + - + - + + + + + - + + - + -
Table 4-3: Behavior of selected variables during the South East Asian and Russian crisis
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund/IMF, Washington D.C.; Economic
Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean/ECLAC, Santiago de Chile; Instituto Nacional de Estadística/INE,
Montevideo; Secretaria Administrativa del MERCOSUR, Montevideo
4.4.3  The Russian Crisis
Less than a year later, the South East Asian crisis was to be followed by the Russian
crisis. On 17 August 1998 the Russian government widened the exchange rate band of the
Russian ruble and announced the moratorium of some of its outstanding debt. The repercussion
of the Russian crisis on the MERCOSUR economies was clearly reflected by the behavior of the
analyzed variables. Except Argentina, all MERCOSUR countries faced a loss of reserves in the
third quarter. Real domestic credit showed decelerating growth in the third quarter of 1998 in
Argentina and Brazil and continued to decrease in Paraguay. Industrial production decreased
significantly in Argentina and Brazil. During two consecutive periods, in the third and the fourth
quarter of 1998, industrial production declined. In Uruguay, the seasonally adjusted IVF became
negative in the second and in the fourth quarter of 1998. Shocks to the domestic interest rates44
occurred in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. To conclude, the repercussions of the Russian crisis
on the MERCOSUR economies were symmetric in nature and seem to be more pronounced than
























94:1 94:3 95:1 95:3 96:1 96:3 97:1 97:3 98:1 98:3
UGY_IVF UGY_IVFSA
Diagram 4-12: MERCOSUR: Development of seasonally adjusted industrial production
Source: Macroeconomic indicators of Argentina and Brazil, Economic Commission for Latina America and the
Caribbean/ECLAC, Buenos Aires and Brasilia; Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Montevideo
4.5  Traditional OCA Criteria and the Optimality of MERCOSUR
THESIS 5:  If optimum currency area criteria derived from the traditional
approaches to optimum currency area are not satisfied, it cannot be concluded that
the respective currency area is not optimal. The MERCOSUR countries do not, or
only to a limited extent, fulfill these criteria. Within the context of MERCOSUR
these criteria suffer serious caveats, theoretically as well as empirically.
4.5.1  Symmetry of Shocks
Prior to the creation of MERCOSUR all the member countries of today’s MERCOSUR
had been subject to frequent shocks whose origins were highly heterogeneous. Endogenous
shocks that followed political instability, credit restrictions originating from the external sector,
changes of the economic model (Convertibility Plan, Plan Real), etc. The analysis of these
shocks proved to be highly challenging, inter alia, due (1) to the properties of the empirical data
available  - the available series are integrated by different orders, display structural breaks, etc.
(2) The application of multivariate time series techniques is highly data consuming. With respect
to MERCOSUR large samples do not exist due to the simple fact that MERCOSUR was
founded 10 years ago. Consequently larger samples would include Pre-MERCOSUR data. (3)
Large representative continuous samples are hardly available for MERCOSUR countries at all.
80
The application of the univariate time series method Beveridge-Nelson decomposition on the
respective GDP series will show that cycles differed considerably in the past (until 1995:4
                                                
80 Standard data sources like IFS, national statistical institutes, World Bank and many more were consulted
for large samples of continuous time series data. Moreover, it was already indicated earlier in this work that in the
case of Paraguay, if statistical data is available at all, this data does not reflect the black market economy that
represents up to 50% of the Paraguayan economic activity.45
4.5.1.1  Decomposition of the GDP of the MERCOSUR Countries into a Permanent
Stochastic Trend and Temporary Shocks
The Method
Originally it was intended to apply the Blanchard and Quah decomposition of a vector
autoregression (VAR) method (Blanchard and Quah, 1989). By the means of a structural
decomposition of a VAR demand shocks (defined as temporary shocks) and supply shocks
(having a permanent effect on output) are identified. This method allows for analyzing the
timely coincidence of temporary and permanent shocks in a group of countries. In addition, it
allows for the comparison of the dynamics of the shocks by the means of impulse-response
functions. In practice, however, available time series data for the MERCOSUR countries
resulted to be inappropriate for the application of the before described method.
In other studies – inter alia, Bayoumi and Eichengreen(1993) - the real GDP which tends
to be I(1) and the deflator of GDP or CPI which tends to be I(0) were used.
81 In case CPI were
I(1) it could also be differenced (Enders, 1995, p. 332). Nonetheless, both series need to be
stationary. For Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay continuous time series for GDP and CPI were
available, which were tested for the presence of a unit root by the Philips-Perron and the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
82
The results of these tests rendered the application of the Blanchard-and-Quah method to
all three countries Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay impossible.
83 Although the GDP for all three
countries was I(1), the orders of integration for the CPI of the respective countries were mixed.
Seasonally adjusted series (1980:1 – 1995:4) of the CPI for the three countries have been tested
for the presence of a unit root. CPIBRA was clearly I(1), CPIARG was I(1) by the Philips Perron-
Test and I(2) by the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and finally CPIUGY was clearly I(2). Also the
log of the same series showed a mixed picture. CPIARG was I(1) with the Philips-Perron test and
I(2) with the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. CPIBRA was I(1) although only at a 10% significance
level. CPIUGY was  I(1) by the Philips-Perron Test at a 10% significance level and by the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test it was I(2).
As an alternative method the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition was chosen (Beveridge
and Nelson, 1981). A univariate series is decomposed into its stochastical trend (permanent
component) and into a stationary series (cycle, transitory or irregular component). It is assumed
that the time series of concern is stationary in its first differences and is represented by an
autoregressive moving-average process (ARMA process). Although at first sight this process
seems to exhibit a trend, (it displays a persistent upward drift) it is an accumulation of
autocorrelated changes that have a positive mean value. Assume a series zt which is written in its
first difference wt.
                                                
81 A series is said to be integrated of order one – this denotes I(1) – if after taking the first difference a
stationary process results.
82 For a short introduction on unit-root testing see Greene(1997, pp. 847) or Kennedy(1992, pp. 265). The
augmented Dickey-Fuller test is more appropriate for small samples in the case of non-normal errors and
heteroskedasticity whereas the Philips Perron test displays better properties when applied to large samples and if the
errors are autocorrelated. Since the sample size was intermediate both tests were used for the time series at hand.
83 The GDP and CPI time series used in this section were drawn from the sources as follows: International
Financial Statistics/IFS, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.; Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos,
Buenos Aires; Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística/IBGE, Rio de Janeiro; Instituto Naciona de Estadística,
Montevideo; Banco Central do Brasil, Brasilia; Banco Central de la República Argentina, Buenos Aires, Banco
Central del Uruguay, Montevideo. Quarterly observations for the Paraguayan GDP and CPI were not available.46
wt=zt – zt-1 ( 4-6 )
Due to the decomposition theorem of Wold the following model results.
f(L)(wt-m)=q(L)et ( 4-7 )
The optimal linear predictor zt+k is represented by the sum of the contemporaneous zt and
the predicted wt accumulated wt to wt+k:
￿ = + =
k
j t t t j w z k z
1 ) ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ( 4-8 )
As indicated before wt is stationary and consequently asymptotically a linear function in
k. The function has the slope m (the rate of drift of the series) and the intercept zt, which is the
permanent or the trend component of zt, or in the words of Beveridge and Nelson(1981, p. 156)
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The cyclical or transitory component is obtained by the difference between the
contemporaneous permanent component zt and the contemporaneous observation zt.
t t t z z c - = ( 4-10 )
In literature the implications of equation ( 4-10 ) were subject to critique. The transitory
component is perfectly negatively correlated with the stochastic trend component. Watson(1986)
objects that there is no unique decomposition. Any correlation coefficient between –1 and 1 is
theoretically possible. However, in the short-run the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition produces
similar results for the standard error for the one-step ahead forecast like the trend plus noise
model used by Watson (Enders, 1995, p. 195).
Preparation, First Analysis and Unit Root Tests
The raw series were adjusted seasonally by a multiplicative moving average procedure
as provided by EViews 2.0®. In addition, the series were transformed into natural logarithms,
not least due to scalability reasons. For a first approximation to the correlation of the shocks the
correlation coefficients for the GDP series, as well as their means and their standard deviation
expressing its volatility, were calculated.47
Correlation-Matrix
D DGDP (in log
differences and
seasonaly adjusted)




D GDP Arg 1.000 0.002 0.034
D GDP Bra 0.242 1.000 0.004 0.029
whole series
1980:1 – 1995:4
D GDP Ugy 0.153 0.187 1.000 0.004 0.050
D GDP Arg 1.000 -0.002 0.040
D GDP Bra 0.011 1.000 0.005 0.023
Pre-mercosur period
1985:4 – 1990:1
D GDP Ugy 0.296 0.531 1.000 0.011 0.026
D GDP Arg 1.000 0.013 0.032
D GDP Bra 0.558 1.000 0.004 0.039
MERCOSUR period
1991:2 – 1995:4
D GDP Ugy 0.030 0.247 1.000 0.009 0.033
Table 4-4: Correlation of quarterly D GDPArg, D GDPBra, DGDPUgy
Source: Source: International Financial Statistics/IFS, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.;
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos, Buenos Aires; Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e
Estatística/IBGE, Rio de Janeiro; Instituto Naciona de Estadística, Montevideo; Banco Central do Brasil,
Brasilia; Banco Central de la República Argentina, Buenos Aires, Banco Central del Uruguay,
Montevideo.
Between 1980 and 1995 the correlation of the GDP differences of the three countries is
in a range between 0.153 and 0.242. This could be described as low correlation. In terms of
volatility the GDP of Uruguay deviates as much as approximately 5% from its mean of 0.4%.
Argentina’s GDP deviates 3.4% from its mean of 0.2% and finally Brazil’s GDP 2.9% from its
mean of 0.4% (see Table 4-4).
84 The same indicators are shown for the period before and after
the creation of MERCOSUR.
85 In the Pre-MERCOSUR period there was no correlation
between the Argentinean and the Brazilian GDP. Interestingly, the GDP of Uruguay correlated
positively by a factor of 0.531 and 0.296 with the Brazilian and the Argentinean GDP. Volatility
of the Uruguayan and Brazilian GDP was almost half (2.6% and 2.3% respectively) that of the
Argentinean GDP of 4%. In the respective period the Argentinean economy was the only
economy that on average displayed a negative growth rate (0.2%).
The MERCOSUR period shows a strong correlation between the Argentinean and the
Brazilian GDP (0.558). The Uruguayan GDP showed a higher correlation with the Brazilian
GDP (0.247) than with the Argentinean GDP (0.03). In the initial stage of MERCOSUR the
quarterly growth rate of the Argentinean GDP topped the one of Brazil by far (1.3% compared
to 0.4%). In terms of growth Uruguay was intermediate. Volatility of GDP increased in Brazil
and in Uruguay. In Argentina GDP volatility decreased relative to the Pre-MERCOSUR period.
A first approximate statistical analysis yields the result that Argentinean and Brazilian
cycles became more synchronized after the creation of MERCOSUR. In terms of the average
growth rate the two countries showed a strong divergence over the considered period. Uruguay
became less synchronized with both other economies over time. Nonetheless Uruguay displays
the most stable average growth within the respective period.
Before running the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition on the three GDP time series, unit
root tests of all the series were performed. Contrary to the CPI series, regardless of the testing
method applied (the Philips-Perron test or the augmented Dickey Fuller test), all GDP series
                                                
84 GDP growth is measured as change in the logarithm of real GDP. Consequently a value of 0.01 can be
interpreted roughly as a change of 1%.
85 The sample for the Pre-MERCOSUR period was shortened for reasons of comparability between the
simple correlation of GDP and the correlation of the irregular component calculated by the Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition.48
were  I(1) at a 1% significance level. Thus, all of them fulfilled the precondition for the
application of the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition.
Estimation of ARMA Properties of Differenced Real GDP Time Series of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
It was indicated earlier that the differences of the series of concern are represented by an
autoregressive moving-average process. The next logical step for proceeding with the analysis is
the identification of the ARMA process for each considered time series. As selection criteria for
the ARMA processes, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), the Schwartz-Bayes criterion
(SBC) and the Ljung-Box Q-statistics were used.
86 Lag lengths were analyzed for a maximum
of 4 lags, both AR and MA operators (in order to capture rests of seasonality). Larger lag lengths
were not selected, since a parsimonious model was intended and, with slightly more than 60
observations, a larger number of operators would have meant a too large loss in degrees of
freedom. For the estimation of the autoregressive integrated moving-average models (ARIMA)
the econometrics package for time series RATS® 4.0 DOS was used.
The following processes were identified for the GDPs of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
(t-statistics denote in parenthesis).
GDPARG
Dlyt = 0.001 – 1.929Dlyt-1 – 0.571Dlyt-2 + 0.02Dlyt-3 + 0.281 Dlyt-4 + et + 1.207et-1 + 0.695et-2 
          (0.203) (-5.816)         (-2.479)         (0.098)        (1.912)                  (8.198)      (4.735) ( 4-11 )
The GDP series of Argentina ( GDPARG) was found to be an ARIMA(4,1,2) series.
Identification of the process was straight forward, since this process was one of the few that did
not exhibit serial correlation of the residuals in higher orders according to the Ljung-Box Q-
statitistics.
GDPBRA
Dlyt = 0.004 + 0.008Dlyt-1 – 0.415Dlyt-2 + 0.218Dlyt-3 + + et
         (1.485)  (0.678)        (-3.392)          (1.619) ( 4-12 )
The GDP series for Brazil ( GDPBRA)was identified as ARIMA(3,1,0) process. Two
competing models ARIMA (4,1,3) and ARIMA(3,1,0) resulted according to the AIC and SBC
criteria. Finally, the better fit of the in-sample forecast, of the latter model, was conclusive for its
choice.
GDPUGY
Dlyt = 0.003 - 0.363Dlyt-1 – 0.238Dlyt-2 + 0.022Dlyt-3 + 0.479Dlyt-4 + et + 0.154et-1
         (0.602) (-1.584)       (-1.695)          (0.144)           (3.893)                 (0.587) ( 4-13 )
Similar to the Brazilian GDP series, two competing models for the Uruguayan GDP
series (GDPUGY) were compared. ARIMA(4,1,0) and ARIMA(4,1,1) showed an almost similar
fit in the in-sample forecast, thus, the slightly lower SBC for the latter was decisive for its
                                                
86 For a short exploration on identification-estimation diagnostic checking on ARIMA models see
Mills(1994, pp. 116).49
choice.
Results of the Beveridge-Nelson Decomposition
The results of the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition are displayed graphically and will
briefly be discussed diagram by diagram. The irregular component c, of all three series, was
tested for stationarity that represents a precondition for the validity of the applied model
(compare 0). For all c series the augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejected the hypothesis of the
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ZBAR C
cycle or irregular component
permanent component
Mercosur Pre-Mercosur
Diagram 4-13: Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of the Argentinean GDP
1985:4 – 1995:4 (RATS 4.0 ® @BNDECOMP)
The Argentinean growth path shows a large structural break around 1990 (see Diagram
4-13). From then on, coinciding with the introduction of the Convertibility Plan in 1990, growth
resumed and displayed a clearly positive slope until the advent of the Mexican crisis at the end
of 1994. In the sample, Argentina is the economy that shows the largest break in the growth path
that happened approximately one year before the creation of MERCOSUR. An initial visual
analysis of the cycle shows a reduction in its volatility. Both economies, the one of Argentina
and the one of Brazil, were marked by extremely unstable (economic) policies throughout the









86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95
ZBAR C
cycle or irregular component
permanent component
Mercosur Pre-Mercosur
Diagram 4-14: Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of the Brazilian GDP
1985:4 – 1995:4 (RATS 4.0 ® @BNDECOMP)
The Brazilian growth path exhibits a structural break around 1990/91 too, that is
comparatively less pronounced than the one of Argentina (see  Diagram  4-14). The break
coincides with the late years of the Collor-de-Melho administration, that were marked by an
important fiscal mismanagement accompanied by hyperinflation (Edwards, 1997, p. 86). This
break is also reflected by the cyclical component that shows the largest peaks and lows during
this period. Contrary to Argentina the cycle component displays higher volatility during the
MERCOSUR period than before. Nonetheless, it has to be born in mind that the implementation
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Diagram 4-15: Beveridge-Nelson decomposition of the Uruguayan GDP
1985:4 – 1995:4 (RATS 4.0 ® @BNDECOMP)
The Uruguayan growth path resembles the pattern one is most used to when analyzing
the growth path of the so called industrialized economies. Neither major structural breaks
become visually evident regarding the permanent component nor does the cyclical component
display significant volatility.
The visual analysis of the three graphs draws a disharmonic picture of the behavior from
the cycles as well as from the growth path of the MERCOSUR economies. This impression was
not only confirmed by the foregoing analysis of the correlation coefficients of the changes of the
differenced GDP series, but also by the correlation coefficients of its permanent and irregular
components. In the Pre-MERCOSUR period, changes in the permanent component show little
correlation of 0.108 between the two large economies Argentina and Brazil. Uruguay shows a
relatively strong correlation with the two large economies, 0.423 with Argentina and 0.591 with
Brazil. Unsurprisingly, changes in the permanent component correlate slightly more than
changes of the GDP do, though this difference is not really pronounced. During the
MERCOSUR period, changes of the permanent component correlate slightly positively between
Argentina and Brazil (0.212 and 0.207 respectively). The correlation of the changes of the
permanent component between Uruguay and Brazil clearly turns negative with a factor of 0.392.
The irregular component (cycle) shows a somewhat different picture. During the Pre-
MERCOSUR period the Argentinean and the Brazilian cycle correlated with a coefficient of
0.352 and the Uruguayan and the Brazilian cycle with an almost negligible 0.149. The
Uruguayan and Argentinean cycle show a slightly negative correlation of –0.069. During the
MERCOSUR period the cyclical correlation coefficient between Argentina and Brazil and
Uruguay and Brazil become negative (-0.25 and -0.372 respectively). The cycles between
Uruguay and Argentina became strongly correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.566.
At least two conclusions can be drawn: (1) The correlation coefficients of the
differenced GDP were bad proxies for the correlation coefficients of the cycles in both periods,
the Pre-MERCOSUR and the MERCOSUR period. (2) The cycles of all three countries showed52
little correlation in the Pre-MERCOSUR period. One exception is the correlation between the
Argentinean and Uruguayan cycle that correlate significantly positively.
87 Cycles seem to have
widened their asymmetries in the early stage of MERCOSUR. This may be also due to the fact
that Argentina and Uruguay were able to successfully implement stabilization programs at an
earlier stage than Brazil could. Carrera et al.(1998) decomposed the GDP of Argentina and
Brazil into its trend and cycle components by differencing the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series
from the original series. For the period 1980:1 to 1991:1 they obtain a correlation coefficient of
the two cycles of 0.30 and for the subsequent period 1991:2 – 1993:3 the coefficient equals
-0.55. Thus, the Argentinean and Brazilian cycles show roughly comparable correlation
coefficients with either decomposition method.
88












1991:2 – 1995:4 GDPUgy 0.207 -0.392 1.000
Table 4-5: Correlation matrix of  z D
calculated by RATS 4.0 ® @BNDECOMP procedure












1991:2 – 1995:4 GDPUgy 0.566 -0.372 1.000
Table 4-6: Correlation matrix of c
calculated by RATS 4.0 ® @BNDECOMP procedure
4.5.2  Factor Mobility
If shocks occur asymmetrically between countries, as was shown in the previous section
other adjustment mechanisms are required. Labor mobility, although often treated in studies on
OCA theory, proves to be a very unsatisfactory OCA criterion. Despite these theoretical and
empirical drawbacks labor mobility, in the large MERCOSUR countries, does not seem to be of
importance. Wage flexibility has improved over the last years. Nonetheless, wages in the
MERCOSUR countries are still relatively rigid. The degree of financial market integration is
high in Argentina and in Uruguay but less so in Brazil.
                                                
87 A significantly positive correlation here is defined to be within the range of 0.5 and 1.0.
88 For a detailed comparision between the Hodrick-Prescott filtered data and the Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition and a critique on Carrera et al.(1998) see Kronberger (2001a, pp. 174).53
4.5.2.1  Labor Mobility
Data on labor migration is relatively scarce in developing countries. From the data
available only very weak conclusions can be drawn. In Argentina censuses with data of

















Bolivians 92,356 17.30% 118,288 15.70% 149,822 18% n/a n/a n/a
Brazilians 44,843 8.40% 42,945 5.70% 35,351 4% 0.05* 0.02 4.8
Chileans 132,928 24.90% 215,480 28.60% 255,034 30% n/a n/a n/a
Paraguayans 211,938 39.70% 262,946 34.90% 261,767 31% 52.84 6.03 5.1
Uruguayans 51,249 9.60% 113,767 15.10% 139,721 17% 12.38 4.48 8.9
Total 533,850 753,428 841,697
Table 4-7: Argentina: Immigrants from bordering countries
Source: Maguid(1997) and Inter-American Development Bank, Washington D.C.,* 1990
The comparison of the respective figures shows that the fraction of Brazilian immigrants
in Argentina was small throughout the observation period. In 1991 0.02% of the Brazilian
population emigrated to Argentina. This represents a fraction that has hardly any influence on
the labor markets of either country. In 1991, the development of the GDP in all two
MERCOSUR countries indicated a recession in Brazil and in Uruguay and a starting recovery in
Argentina, following the introduction of the Convertibility Plan.
90 Thus, according to the
cyclical data a higher fraction of Brazilian immigrants could have been expected, if Brazilian
laborers were mobile and if labor mobility were facilitated by the respective labor laws. Further,
the language barrier between these two countries has to be taken into account.
The fraction of Uruguayan immigrants in Argentina has increased significantly over
time. In 1970 51,249 Uruguayans emigrated to Argentina. By 1991 this number more than
doubled to 139,721 immigrants. In terms of its total population 4.48% of the Uruguayan
population moved its residence from Uruguay to Argentina. Besides the lower performance of
the Uruguayan economy, in terms of its GDP, unemployment was also relatively higher in
Uruguay than in Argentina (8.9% compared to 6.5%). Hence, the aggregate economic variables
GDP and unemployment could support the thesis that economic reasons were the cause for the
relatively large stock of Uruguayan immigrants in Argentina.
In absolute numbers Paraguayan immigrants represent the largest share of immigrants
from the bordering countries in Argentina.
91 In 1980 and in 1991 approximately 260,000
Paraguayans resided in Argentina. They represented 6% of the total Paraguayan population.
Heikel and Rojas Bahr(1993, p. 108) indicate wage differentials and cycles as the main reason
for the large flow of Paraguayans to Argentina. However - as is true for all of the before
presented figures on an aggregate level - clear conclusions cannot be drawn. Little knowledge of
the socio-economic characteristics of the migrating population exists. One example would be:
Do Paraguayan immigrants have a temporary working license and return to their domestic
country after its expiration or do they have a permanent residence in the host country? This
                                                
89 Argentina itself is an expeller of professional, technical and qualified labor that heads mainly to the US,
Canada and Europe and at the same time a receiving country in the small regional subsystem (Maguid, 1997, p. 3).
90 Compare Kronberger(2001a, pp. 175).
91 Paraguay receives a large share of Brazilian immigrants. The reasoning, however, is different. Brazilians
hold a considerable share of territory in Paraguay (Heikel and Rojas Bahr, 1993).54
question comes close to the objection raised in 3.2.2.1.2, where it is doubted that migrants would
act to balance internal and external macroeconomic equilibria. What role do legal and cultural
barriers play? How large is the fraction of the economically active population in the cited
statistics? How important are non-economic reasons for the migration flows? In the past many
migrants were motivated by political instability to change their country of residence.
4.5.2.2  Wage Flexibility
The model presented in 3.2.2.1.3 suggests that monetary policy becomes increasingly
ineffective with an increasing degree of wage indexation. Presently, real wage rigidity in the
MERCOSUR countries seems to be high (Levi Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 1999a, pp. 12). An
insulated consideration of real wage-unemployment elasticities of economies, that recently have
undergone high-impact stabilization programs and are currently in a strong liberalization process
involved, will not provide a complete explanation. Diagram 4-16 shows graphically the path of
the real average wage and unemployment in Argentina from 1991 to 1998. Until the end of 1996
unemployment had been growing almost continuously despite slowly decaying real average
wages. The trend in unemployment reversed thereafter without any visually recognizable change
in the path of real wages.
Diagram  4-17 shows the evolution of real average wages in Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay. For reasons of comparison the wage indices are shown on a logarithmic scale. Real
wages in Argentina do not show important changes. Brazilian wages increased significantly
following the introduction of the Real Plan.


































































































































Diagram 4-16: Argentina: Log of unemployment and real average wages
Source: Altimir and Beccaria(1999) and Economic Commission for the
Caribbean and Latin America/ECLAC, Santiago de Chile
The maxi-devaluation in January 1999 brought real wages back to the level that
prevailed before the introduction of the Real Plan. Uruguayan wages increased slightly from
1993 to 1996. From then on real wages stayed relatively stable. In 1999 wages started to fall
slightly. The level of 1993, however, was not achieved. Wages still remained just beyond the
1993 level. As can be seen from Diagram 4-17 wages do not seem to have reacted dramatically
to the major external crisis in South East Asia in 1997 or Russia in 1998. Wages in Uruguay
seem to have reacted more strongly to the Brazilian crisis in 1999 than did the wages in
Argentina.
The conclusions that can be drawn from the relationship between wages and
unemployment in Argentina are only such that the unemployment-wage elasticity will not tell55
the whole story for the causes of unemployment in Argentina. The evolution of real wages in the
different MERCOSUR countries has to be seen in the context of different and changing
exchange rate regimes. Further, both, unemployment and wages, are subject to a changing
environment due to the ongoing liberalization in all the MERCOSUR countries, vis-à-vis the
MERCOSUR countries but also vis-à-vis the rest of the world. From 1990 to 1996 8.2 million
new jobs were created, of which 7.9 millions were in the informal sector.

























































































































































Diagram 4-17: MERCOSUR: Averages wage indices in US $ deflated by US CPI
logarithmic scale, moving average for Argentina calculated over 12 periods in Excel 97®
Source: MERCOSUR SWG 4 Commission of Macroeconomic Indicators, Montevideo
Causal factors for unemployment are privatization of public enterprises, and a higher
increase in productivity than in the labor demand as a consequence of the use of new
technologies.
92 The analysis of differences in labor laws and the relative strengths of the unions
would have to be done on a country by country basis in order to describe wage flexibility
accurately. Levi Yeyati and Sturzenegger(1999a, p.12) cite correlations of 1.12 for Argentina
and 1.01 for Brazil between inflation and nominal wages. This correlation provides an additional
measure for the flexibility of wages in the MERCOSUR countries. These numbers would
indicate overly rigid wages in the two countries.
93
4.5.2.3  Integration of Financial Markets
Basically the use of two different methods of measuring the degree of capital market
integration is widely acknowledged. The concept of the covered interest rate differential (CID)
represents the first approach to measuring the degree of capital market integration. A high
interest rate differential between two countries reflects barriers between domestic capital
markets, which take the form of transactions costs, capital controls, default risk, etc. The second
approach is the application of the Feldstein-Horioka equation. If the saving and investment rate
                                                
92 Compare Tokman and Martinez Fernandez(2000) and ILO(1998).
93 Compare p, the measure of indexation in equation ( 3-6 ) in 3.2.2.1.3.56
of a country correlate highly its capital market is assumed to exhibit a low degree of integration.
A third approach that, however, is more limited in scope is the measuring of the co-movement of
stock indices (Eichengreen,1991, p. 6). The closer the considered stock prices move, the less
important regional shocks become; or looked at from the perspective of factor mobility, the
faster factors of production are reallocated from the country suffering a negative shock to
countries which are not affected by this shock.
The Covered Interest Rate Differential
The definition of the covered interest-rate differential (CID) is
CID=i-i*-fd ( 4-14 )
The difference between the nominal domestic interest rate i and the foreign interest rate
i* and the forward premium  fd “...captures all barriers to integration of financial markets
across national boundaries: transactions costs, information costs, capital controls, tax laws that
discriminate by country of residence, default risk and risk of future capital controls.” (Frankel,
1992, p. 200).
Extensive data on forward rates was not available for neither MERCOSUR country.
Garcia and Valpassos(1998) computed the CID for Brazil and used altogether 3 different
measures on the CID (CID computed with US dollar futures, CID computed with Brazilian
bonds issued in US dollar, and the CID computed with Brazilian bonds indexed to US dollars).
94
The second type of computation was chosen for reasons of comparability and of data available.
Ideally the difference between the domestic rate on treasury bills (this corresponds with 60c.f in
the International Financial Statistics) and the US treasury bill (60c) would have served for the
calculation of the CID. This measure was only available for Brazil and Uruguay (see Diagram
4-18). The CID for Uruguay throughout the observation period (from 1995 to 1998) has been
constantly below 1% (during a short period even negative). The CID in Brazil ranged between
5.22% and 13.87% indicating a significantly less integrated capital market of Brazil with the rest
of the world.
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UGY-CID BRA-CID
Covered Interest Rate Differential Brazil - Uruguay
(US Treasury Bill Rate 60c - Treasury Bill Rate Foreign Currency 60p.f)
Diagram 4-18: Brazil and Uruguay: Covered interest rate differential (60c.f-60c)
Source: International Financial Statistics/IFS, International Monetary Fund/IMF,
Washington D.C.
The same indicator was not available for Argentina. Instead of the treasury bill rate, the
lending rate was used (60p.f – 60p) for computing the CID. In 1995 in Argentina, following the
Mexican crisis, the CID topped 8.42%. In 1997 the CID even became negative (see Diagram
4-18). Uruguay’s credit market was less integrated, with a CID ranging between 3.17% and
5.43%. As can be seen by comparing Diagram 4-18 with Diagram 4-19 the credit market is not
identical with the treasury bill market. A larger CID for the credit market than for the treasury
bill market in Uruguay might reflect the fact that creditors in Uruguay faced relatively higher
transaction costs or were more prone to default than treasury bills that are predominantly issued
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UGY-CID ARG-CID
Covered Interest Rate Differential - Argentina - Uruguay
(US-Prime Rate 60p - Lending Rate Foreign Currency 60p.f)
Diagram 4-19: Brazil and Uruguay: Covered interest rate differential (60p.f-60p)
Source: International Financial Statistics/IFS, International Monetary Fund/IMF,
Washington D.C.
The Feldstein-Horioka Equation
Feldstein and Horioka(1980, pp. 316) developed a popular model for measuring
international capital mobility thus referring to long-term capital, since long-term assets are less
likely to be arbitraged internationally. Countries exhibiting a high correlation between their
saving and investment rates have closed financial sectors, showing little capital mobility
internationally (equation ( 4-15 )). Full capital mobility requires that the domestic real interest
rate equals the world real interest rate (real interest rate parity) and that domestic savings are not


















￿ b a ( 4-15 )
Empirically, often residual correlation as well as correlation of the present residual  ut
with (S/Y)t, are likely indicating endogeneity of the latter variable. Procyclical movement of both
saving and investment and/or the influence of government on saving are theoretical explanations
(Frankel, 1992, p. 198). Econometrically endogeneity can be overcome by a time series
approach of the following form:
t
































￿ D d g b a ( 4-16 )
Equation  ( 4-16 ) represents the first equation of an error-correction model. If two
variables are endogenous and converge to a long-run equilibrium, they are said to be
cointegrated. Similar to equation ( 4-15 ) the coefficient b explains the changes in investment by59
changes in saving (short-term relation), or in other words, to what extent is a saving shock
passed through to investment (Taylor, 1997, p12). The g coefficient represents the adjustment
speed to the long-term equilibrium.
The availability of data will constrain the application of the Feldstein-Horioka equation
to the Argentinean case. The data set with quarterly time series was divided into a Pre-
Convertibility Plan period (from 1980:1 to 1991:1) and a Convertibility-Plan period (from
1991:2 to 1995:4). The two estimations of equation XX yielded the following result (The t-
statistics are in parenthesis).
it = 0.023 + 0.807st + et
     (0.295)  (2.09)
( 4-17 )
it = 0.182 + 0.125st + et
                  (2.775)  (0.317)
( 4-18 )
In the Pre-Convertibility-Plan period the positive correlation for the investment and
saving ratios b was equal to 0.807, though the Durbin-Watson coefficient of 0.15 indicates serial
correlation of the residuals. Further  Rhas little explanatory power with a value equal to 0.093.
The period succeeding the introduction of the Law of Convertibility yields a statistically
insignificant b of 0.125. The savings ratio has virtually no explanatory power for investment
with  006 , 0 = R . Even the hypothesis that none of the coefficients are significantly different
from zero cannot be rejected.
Although the outcome of the equations ( 4-17 ) and ( 4-18 ) would suggest that before
the introduction of the Convertibility Plan the Argentinean capital market showed a low degree
of integration and thereafter the degree increased, the results of the Durbon-Watson statistic
cannot be neglected. Serially correlated errors are likely to lead to misspecificated estimators.
The outcome of a biased estimator is probable (Kennedy, 1992, pp. 120).
The Engle-Granger methodology allows for the estimation of time series models whose
variables are integrated at the same order. Although the time series are allowed to diverge
temporarily, over the long run they converge to an equilibrium path, that is, they are
cointegrated. Long run equilibrium is represented by equation ( 4-19 ):
t t t e s i + + = 1 0 b b ( 4-19 )
Short run dynamics are represented by equations ( 4-20 ) and ( 4-21 ):
it
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i denotes the investment to GDP ratio and s the saving to GDP ratio respectively. a i
and/or a s being different from zero indicate the presence of cointegration of the saving and
investment ratios. One and/or the other adjustment coefficient would ensure that the two
variables converge to a long run equilibrium after a shock has occurred. Therefore, a i and a s60
measure the speed of returning to the long run equilibrium.
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The same data set as was used for the simple Feldstein-Horioka estimation, (equation
( 4-17 ) and ( 4-18 )), was tested for the presence of a unit root. The same order of integration
would be the precondition for a valid cointegration system. In the Convertibility Plan period
neither the investment nor the saving series contains a unit root. They are both I(0). For the Pre-
Convertibility Plan period both variables resulted to be integrated of the first order I(1). The
estimation of the long run equilibrium equation yielded a b of 0.918. The constant was left out,
since it proved to be insignificant (t-statistics are denoted in parentheses):
it = 0.918 st +  et 
    (35.748) ( 4-22 )
Following the Engle-Granger methodology with the inclusion of seasonal dummy
variables the cointegration of both variables CI(1,1) can be confirmed (see, for instance, Enders,
1995, pp. 381). The application of the Dickey-Fuller test, for the presence of a unit root, yielded
a t-value of -2.28 (0 lags) and -3.53 for (4 lags). Consequently only with the augmented-Dickey-
Fuller test (4 lags) the hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals of the long-run equilibrium
regression can be rejected.
96 The estimated system for the short run dynamics takes the following
form:
t t t t t i e s i 1 1 1 1 021 . 0 084 . 0 143 . 0 003 . 0 e + D - - D + - = D - - -
)
          (-2.04)    (1.397)        (-1.69)        (-1.44)
( 4-23 )
t t t t t i e s s 2 1 1 1 877 . 0 064 . 0 048 . 0 004 . 0 e + D - + D + - = D - - -
)
          (-1.77)    (0.353)          (0.958)     (-4.42)
( 4-24 )
The speed of adjustment coefficient a i is significant at the 10% level in equation
( 4-23 ).
97 It equals –0.084. The only other variable significant at the 5% level is the constant.
The estimation of equation ( 4-24 ) did not show a significant coefficient for the error-correction
term. The visually inspected residuals e1t and e2t did not show any anomalies. The Durbin-
Watson statistics equaled 2.07 and 2.00 respectively. The use of the Engle-Granger
methodology confirmed the findings of the simple Feldstein-Horioka equation. In the Pre-
Convertibility Plan period the investment and the savings ratio are cointegrated. The
significance level of the adjustment coefficient is at a still acceptable level but the significance is
not very strong.
The Cointegration of the Stock Markets
Sanchez Valle(1998) estimated an error-correction model (Johansen methodology) for
the stock exchange indices of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico for the
period 1976:1 to 1998:3. Like the other two stock exchanges the MERVAL (Argentina), the
BOVESPA (Brazil) and the Dow Jones index (USA) are cointegrated. The 3 stock indices
                                                
95 The term  ) ( 1 1 1 - - - t t s i b can be replaced by  1 - t e )
 which is the residual that estimates the deviation from
the long run equilibrium.
96 The Engle-Yoo critical value for 50 observations and 2 variables equals –3.29 at the 5% and –2.6 at the
10% significance level.
97 When seasonally adjusted data was used ai equaled –0.095 at a 5% significance level. Moreover, a 11
was equal to –0.26 at a 8.5% significance level.61
converge to a long-run equilibrium. The first two estimations cover the whole period, once with
a dummy variable for the 1987 stock exchange crash and once without. In both estimations the
adjustment coefficient for Argentina (-0.020 and –0.018) is much larger than for the two larger
countries (-0.003 and –0.003 for Brazil; 0.004 and 0.003 for the USA) (see Table 4-8). For the
period from 1976 to 1987 the hypothesis of a cointegrated vector for all stock indices was
rejected indicating a lower degree of integration in the second half of the seventies and the first
half of the eighties.
Coefficients of adjustment Argentina Brazil USA
No dummy(1976-1998) -0.0202 -0.0033 0.0040
With dummy (1976-1998) -0.0188 -0.0032 0.0029
Pre-October 1987 (1976-1987)
Rejection of single cointegrating
vector
Post-October 1987 (1987-1998) -0.487 0.0712 0.0581
Table 4-8: Adjustment coefficients indicating stock market integration
in MERCOSUR
Source: Sanchez Valle(1998)
The post-stock exchange crash period from 1987 to 1998 is characterized by much faster
adjustment to shocks, relative to the adjustment in the models estimated from the larger samples.
In Argentina the adjustment coefficient increased to –0.487, in Brazil to 0.071 and in the United
States to 0.058.
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In conclusion, the lack of harmonized data does not allow for directly comparable results
on the degree of capital market integration in all MERCOSUR countries. The CID on the T-bill
markets in Brazil and Uruguay suggests a highly integrated Uruguayan T-bill market and a
highly disintegrated Brazilian T-bill market. By the end of 1998 the CID on foreign currency
credit in Argentina and Uruguay were in a range of 2 to 3%, thus, indicating a relatively high
degree of integration in this financial sector. The estimated Feldstein-Horioka equation for
Argentina confirms that before the introduction of the Convertibility Plan Argentina’s financial
market was highly disintegrated. The change of the order of integration from  I(1) to I(0) for
both, the investment and saving ratio, coincides with the aperture of the Argentinean financial
market. Finally, the cointegration of the stock market indices of Argentina, Brazil and the USA
point at rather highly integrated stock markets in the Western Hemisphere. Levy Yeyati and
Sturzenegger(1999b) provide an overview regarding tests on financial integration which
correspond with the findings presented before in the case of Argentina and in the case of Brazil
(see Table 4-9). For the Brazilian financial markets Garcia and Barcinski(1996) and Garcia and
Valpassos(1998) provide a better benchmark for recent years.
                                                
98 The Merval index already comprises shares, which are also quoted on the New York Stock Exchange.
One example is YPF (its listing can be confirmed by typing ‘YPF’ at the website of the New York Stock Exchange
<http://www.nyse.com>) The same holds true for the Brazilian stock market. Examples for listed Brazilian
enterprises are TELEBRAS, EMBRAER, etc. The double quotation in two stock markets also represents a cause for
a closer comovement of the respective stock indices.62
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Obstfeld(1994)




















Table 4-9: Summary of tests on financial integration in Latin American countries
Source: Levi Yeyati and Sturzenegger(1999b)
4.5.3  Openness of Trade
The McKinnon criterion of trade openness (compare  3.2.2.2) is often applied in
empirical works on the optimum currency area theory. According to the expectations the two
larger MERCOSUR countries show a significantly lower degree of openness than do the smaller
countries. Openness was defined as the ratio of either exports or imports divided by GDP in
nominal terms. The empirical data that is described below is summarized in Table 4-10.
When MERCOSUR was created Argentina’s exports to Brazil were worth 1.01% of its
GDP. The respective figure almost tripled by 1997 to 2.97% and thereafter declined again to
2.03% in 1999. In 1990 imports from Brazil represented 0.51% of GDP. A maximum value of
2.49% was reached in 1997, which in 1999 decreased to 1.99%. In 1999 the two small
MERCOSUR countries Paraguay and Uruguay bought Argentinean products worth 0.19% and
0.28% of the Argentinean GDP. In the same year the two countries sold products worth 0.11%
and 0.14% respectively.
The importance of Brazilian intra-MERCOSUR exports was low in the very beginning
of MERCOSUR. In 1990 Brazil sold exports worth 0.16% of its GDP to Argentina. These
exports increased by approximately 400% to 0.83% in 1993. In 1998 a maximum of 0.87% was
achieved and shed 0.17 percentage points to 0.7% in 1999. The share of Brazilian exports to the
two small MERCOSUR countries Paraguay and Uruguay was 0.1% and 0.09% respectively.
The numbers of the import side in 1999 differ only slightly from the export side. An extremely
small fraction of 0.03% of Paraguayan imports is conspicuous.
Surprisingly the creation of MERCOSUR coincided with an important drop of
Paraguayan sales to Brazil. Initially exports to Brazil represented 5.93% of Paraguayan GDP in
1990, subsequently dropping to 2.65% in 1992, increasing again to 5.42%, and finally dropping
to 2.81% in 1999. After being close to 1% from 1990 to 1996 exports to Argentina increased
sharply to 3.19% in 1997 and finally represented 3.43% in 1999. The import side is
characterized by a more continuous increase. Imports from Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay rose
from 4.22%, 3.27% and 0.19% in 1990 to 10.09%, 7.2% and 0.92% respectively.
Similar to Paraguay the creation of the customs union coincides with a significant
decline in Uruguayan exports to Brazil. Exports to Brazil represented 6.06% of GDP in 1990
and fell to a minimum of 2.4% in 1992 since the inception of MERCOSUR. In 1999 this share
was only slightly higher at 2.79% having been at 4.64% in the previous years. Exports to
Argentina increased from 0.98% in 1990 to 2.55% in 1998 and consequently decreased to63
1.85% in 1999. The Uruguayan import side showed less significant changes. In 1990
Argentinean imports represented 2.62% of the Uruguayan GDP and increased to 3.96% in 1999.
Brazilian exports showed a less considerable decrease from 3.95% in 1990 to 3.24% in 1999.
Trade with the other small MERCOSUR country Paraguay is of hardly any significance, exports
amounted to 0.41% and imports to 0.07% in 1999.
In the ratio of the sum of the intra-MERCOSUR imports and exports to GDP is shown.
In 1999 the respective ratios for Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay were 4.73%, 1.77%,
24.65% and 12.31%, Brazil being the MERCOSUR economy with the lowest degree of
openness vis-à-vis the other three MERCOSUR countries. By the visual inspection of the intra-
MERCOSUR trade to GDP ratios exhibit clear growth for Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay
(150.83%, 103.23% and 65.55% respectively for the period from 1990 to 1999). The same ratio
shows a negative growth for Uruguay (-10.89%).
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Arg X 1990 1999 Bra X 1990 1999 Ugy X 1990 1999 Pgy X 1990 1999
Brasil 1,01% 2,03% Argentina 0,16% 0,70% Argentina 0,98% 1,85% Argentina 1,06% 3,43%
Paraguay 0,10% 0,19% Paraguay 0,09% 0,10% Brazil 6,06% 2,79% Brazil 5,93% 2,81%
Uruguay 0,19% 0,28% Uruguay 0,07% 0,09% Paraguay 0,07% 0,41% Uruguay 0,23% 0,20%
Arg M 1990 1999 Bra M 1990 1999 Ugy M 1990 1999 PgY M 1990 1999
Brasil 0,51% 1,99% Argentina 0,34% 0,76% Argentina 2,62% 3,96% Argentina 3,27% 7,20%
Paraguay 0,03% 0,11% Paraguay 0,08% 0,03% Brazil 3,95% 3,24% Brazil 4,22% 10,09%
Uruguay 0,06% 0,14% Uruguay 0,14% 0,09% Paraguay 0,13% 0,07% Uruguay 0,19% 0,92%
Table 4-10: Intra-MERCOSUR exports and imports as share of GDP,
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internatcional y Culto,
Buenos Aires
Diagram  4-20 further reveals that Brazil’s degree of openness comprising intra- and
extra-MERCOSUR is the lowest within MERCOSUR (13.9%). Intra-MERCOSUR trade is
smallest relative to total Brazilian trade with a share of 2.32 percentage points (or 16.6% of total
Brazilian trade). Argentina is still a relatively closed economy with an overall degree of
openness of 20.76%, of which a fraction of 6.19 percentage points (or 29.8%) represents intra-
MERCOSUR trade. The respective figures for Uruguay and Paraguay are 31.69% and 14.63
percentage points (or 46.16%) and 54.13% and 28.8 percentage points (or 53.2%) The two small
MERCOSUR economies do not only have a higher degree of openness in terms of total trade
but are also more intertwined with MERCOSUR in terms of their high share of intra-
MERCOSUR trade.
                                                
99 Far reaching commercial bilateral agreements, already concluded in the eighties between Uruguay and
Brazil might have reduced trade barriers between these two countries considerably before the creation of
MERCOSUR. Trade between the two countries might have caught up to levels of trade usually observed between
neighbor countries with low trade barriers. Thus, later in the nineties the development of trade responded less to the
elimination of trade barriers than to, for example, the business cycles of the neighboring countries. The same
argument would be valid for Paraguay. The effects of its large black market and smuggling might be similar to that
of the trade agreements.64








Intra-Mercosur 6,19% 2,32% 28,80% 14,63%
Extra-Mercosur 14,57% 11,65% 25,33% 17,06%
Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay
Diagram 4-20: Degree of openness: Intra- and extra-MERCOSUR trade as share of GDP
Source: Centro de Economía Internacional, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio
Internacional y Culto, Buenos Aires and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, Washington D.C.
MERCOSUR Intra-Industry Trade
The analysis of trade openness should be accompanied by the analysis of intra-industry
trade. Lucangeli(1993) analyzes intra-industry trade between Argentina and Brazil according to
the methodology of Grubel and Lloyd(1975). From 1984 to 1992 intra-industry trade increased
from 22.2% to 33.7%. A more recent study on intra-industry trade was done by Baumann(1998).
In 1992 he calculated the share of intra-industry trade between Argentina and Brazil of 36% (3
digits) and in 1993 47% (3 digits) and 41% (5 digits). In 1996 the respective levels were 56%
and 45%. It has to be stressed that the computation of the respective shares was done with a
varying number of products. Comparability between the two studies and also between the single
years in the Baumann(1998) study is thus limited. For the development of intra-industry trade of
Brazil with Argentina, Brazil with MERCOSUR and Brazil with MERCOSUR and the
associated countries Bolivia and Chile see Diagram 4-21.
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Diagram 4-21: Intra-industry trade: Brazil/Argentina /MERCOSUR (+2)
Source: Baumann(1998)65
4.6  Endogeneity of OCA Criteria
THESIS 6: Integration of trade will probably increase the degree of trade openness
and therefore lead to a higher degree of symmetry of shocks. In MERCOSUR the
customs union is not yet perfectly implemented, and it was created just several
years ago. With further trade integration, a further increase in intra-trade and less
asymmetrical shocks to the trading bloc are likely.
Business cycles were subject to analysis in 4.4. Shocks to GDP between 1985 and 1995
tended to be asymmetrical. Shocks were decomposed into permanent and transitory components
but no distinction between exogenous and endogenous shocks could be made. Carrera et
al.(1998) provides a decomposition into endogenous and exogenous shocks
(see 4.4). In their analysis exogenous shocks tend to be more symmetrical than endogenous
shocks to GDP. Thus, it can be concluded that endogenous shocks to the MERCOSUR
economies have been rather asymmetrical in the past. This does not, however, mean that this
asymmetry has to persist in the future.
It was found that further integration of trade and deeper economic integration in general
will likely lead to the convergence of the business cycles in an economically integrated area
(compare  3.2.3.1). An empirical analysis whether business cycles have converged in
MERCOSUR will not be very fruitful at the moment due to the lack of usable data. From the
eighties on trade integration deepened on an international (Garriga and Sanguinetti, 1995a,
pp. 6) and regional scale. The transition of the customs union ended in 1994, with the two large,
and in 1995, with the two small, MERCOSUR countries.
100 From the point of view of trade
integration it would only make sense to analyze business cycles from 1995 on.
101
However, no doubt remains that the creation of MERCOSUR resulted in a significant
increase of intra-regional trade flows. This impact not only becomes evident by regarding the
openness of trade figures in 4.5.3 but its effects have also been confirmed econometrically in a
gravity equation model by Garriga and Sanguinetti(1995b). Bilateral trade correlates positively
with the product of the GDPs and negatively with the geographical distance between the two
countries. Comparing two data sets (1987 and 1992) and adding two dummy variables
(adjacency in terms of contiguous borders and a MERCOSUR dummy variable) as well as an
explanatory openness variable (trade in terms of GDP), the two authors find that the creation of
MERCOSUR had significant effects on the trade flows. For the 1992 data set, all estimated
variables were significant at the 1% level and showed the expected signs. Thus, Garriga and
Sanguinetti(1995b, p. 21) “conclude ... that tariff preferences within MERCOSUR have had an
independent and positive effect on regional trade. Nevertheless it is also clear that once
geography and unilateral trade policies are taken into account, the effect of tariff preferences on
bilateral trade is greatly moderated.” In other words, the effect of MERCOSUR is
comparatively small to the effects of unilateral trade liberalization and geography. Does this
change the conjecture for the endogeneity of the OCA criteria for MERCOSUR? If it does, it
does so only to a limited extent. Whether unilateral trade liberalization cum the increased
                                                
100 For a more detailed analysis on tariffs and remaining trade protection in MERCOSUR see Laird(1997).
101 In the study of Frankel and Rose(1996) the time interval used for the econometrical analysis was 34
years and thus could grasp a number of subsequent cycles. For MERCOSUR, at the time of writing, the respective
time interval would be five years.66
importance of geography or preferential trade agreements, in the form of a customs union,
explain increasing bilateral trade will not change the conclusions to be drawn for the
endogeneity of the OCA criteria. Cycles should be expected to converge within MERCOSUR
and if the unilateral trade liberalization explains trade with the rest of the world cycles should
also converge accordingly with the cycles of the rest of the world.
Endogeneity has not only to be seen in terms of a different trade policy but also in terms
of stabilized economic policies in general. It is often highlighted in literature that Latin
American economies were subject to frequent and severe policy shocks in the past. This was due
to political mismanagement and subsequent attempts to stabilize the respective economies (see
inter alia Ramos, 1985; and Bruno, 1988). Since these shocks were numerous and are difficult to
identify and above all seem to be highly irrelevant for the current state of the MERCOSUR
economies (all of them increased their stability significantly from 1995 on), conclusions drawn
on the analysis of business cycles in the eighties and the first half of the nineties should be very
cautiously dealt with. In this period the business cycles of the MERCOSUR countries were very
much influenced by endogenous policy shocks. Thus, analyzing the convergence of the business
cycles from the point of view of endogenous policy shocks seems to make much more sense
than from the moment of the successful implementation of the respective stabilization programs,
than before. Hence, if one would like to avoid the ‘noise’ of frequent endogenous policy shocks
on the MERCOSUR economies one should start with the analysis of the cycles from 1995 on,
when the last successful stabilization program in Brazil was implemented in 1995 (see e.g.
Bacha, 1997).
4.7  Exchange Rate Rules, Price Level Stability, and Political Convergence
THESIS 7:  The establishment of a common central bank with the principle
objective of price level stability requires a bundle of rules and measures, inter alia,
the guarantee of the independence of the national central banks that represent the
predecessors of the common central bank. The central banks of the MERCOSUR
countries have already shown accelerating convergence in their degree of
independence in recent years.
Economies with a large record of failed stabilization attempts will have to show
extraordinarily commitment in order to benefit from the credibility effect (if they tie their hands
to a ‘conservative’ central banker). The Convertibility Plan would be one example where a
successful stabilization program has benefitted from this effect. The parity of the Argentinean
peso with the US dollar was decreed by law for demonstrating absolute commitment to the
exchange rate rule. Even despite this commitment the Argentinean monetary regime suffered
credibility losses due to spillovers from the Mexican crisis, the South East Asian and Russian
crisis. The credibility of the monetary regime had to be restored by additional measures: the
provision of rules and regulations in the financial sector that aimed at protection and
improvements of the soundness of the financial system, as, for example, the reduction of reserve
requirements of the private banks and remuneration of these reserves, the creation of an
emergency fund for endangered financial institutions and the provision of a lender of last resort
function by a consortium of foreign banks and international institutions. Moreover, the central
bank made sure that for the improvement of the market mechanism, for example, from 1998 on
private banks were obliged to disclose their credit ratings to the public, etc. (Calomiris and
Powell, 2000).67
Now, suppose the MERCOSUR countries agreed about the creation of a common
MERCOSUR central bank (MCB) with the exclusion of the currency-board-for-all-
MERCOSUR-countries variant.
102 Since the three MERCOSUR countries Argentina, Brazil and
Uruguay showed hyperinflationary or highly inflationary behavior in their recent past,
commitment of the MCB to the stable-price level objective would be crucial.
As with the creation of the European central bank (ECB), independence of the MCB
would represent an important ingredient for signaling effective commitment to the price level
objective. Besides the commitment to price level stability the credibility of the MCB could be
increased by sensible regulations with respect to the protection of the soundness of the banking
system, provision of the necessary preconditions of a functioning market mechanism, rules of
regulation and direct intervention and avoidance of the use of derivatives.
103
In many of these fields the central banks of the single MERCOSUR countries have
already made significant advances. In particular, the central banks could significantly enhance
their degree of independence in recent years. Thus, the question of credibility would rest, inter
alia, on two important aspects.
1) Can the MCB be credible without an exchange rate rule linked to the US dollar?
2) Do the national MERCOSUR economies already have sufficiently independent
central banks? Would the MERCOSUR members allow for a supranational independent MCB,
thus ceding national sovereign rights to a supranational authority?
4.7.1  A MERCOSUR Central Bank without an Exchange Rate Rule?
The case of the Brazilian maxi-davaluation of January 1999, with the successive change
of the exchange-rate regime, had shown that after adhering to an exchange rate based
stabilization program the abandonment of the exchange rate anchor did not necessarily lead to a
relapse into its hyperinflationary past. Partly the successful changeover (in terms of the
maintained price level stability) is attributable to the increased credibility of the Brazilian central
bank (compared to Pre-Real Plan periods) and also due to its increased degree of independence
at the expense of elevated interest rates (see Godfajn and Baig, 2000, p. 12).
4.7.2  Convergence in Independence of the National Central Banks in MERCOSUR
Independence of the national central banks of the MERCOSUR members has increased
steadily over the past years and has already augmented to high levels and therefore helped to
lend the respective monetary authorities increased credibility. Hence, when thinking in terms of
a credible future MCB the question will be whether the MERCOSUR members agree credibly
on common objectives and rules for the MCB and whether they are prepared to cede national
sovereign rights to a supranational entity. Nonethelss, it has to be taken into account that Brazil
‘represents two thirds’ of MERCOSUR. In real political terms it is difficult to imagine that
Brazil would cede power to a supranational entity where all four MERCOSUR countries were
represented by equal shares. However, it is not intended to analyze political motives for and
against the establishment of a common central bank for MERCOSUR from the perspective of
                                                
102 Eichengreen(1998) discusses three monetary options for MERCOSUR: (1) a currency board for all, (2)
a single currency for MERCOSUR, and (3) no exchange-rate coordination.
103 Compare also Blejer(1998).68
the respective member country.
In the following a tentative answer to the questions will be given whether the central
banks of MERCOSUR have been able to increase their degree of independence and to which
extent. The results of two studies of two different time periods was compared. Cukierman(1992)
- he constructed a set of indicators for the measurement of the degree of central bank
independence for the period 1950 to 1989 - and Zagari Rigolon(1996) - this study updates the
Cukierman indicators for the Brazilian central bank up to 1996 - will be presented and
compared. In addition, the Organic Charter of the Argentinean central bank and the Argentinean
Law of Convertibility were analyzed according to the Cukierman criteria.
Cukierman distinguishes three different sets of indicators for the measurement of central
bank independence: (1) legal independence, (2) turnover of central bank governors, (3) and a
questionnaire identifying factors which most likely are responsible for the divergence between
the central bank charter and the actual practice. The turnover of central bank governors should
also like (3) show the deviation of the actual term in office and the legal norm in general.
(1) Cukierman constructed sixteen variables that were divided into the four groups: chief
executive officer, policy formulation, final objectives and limitations on lending. A value equal
to 1 corresponds with the highest degree of independence and a value equal to 0 corresponds
with the lowest degree. For Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay the average without weights of these
16 variables





Table 4-11: Degree of legal central bank
independence in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay
from 1972 to 1989
Source: calculations based on Cukierman(1992,
pp. 396)
In the seventies and in the eighties the degree of legal independence of the Brazilian and
Uruguayan Central Bank were found on the lower edge, 0.20 and 0.22 respectively. The degree
of legal independence of the Argentinean central bank almost doubled the ones of the other two
MERCOSUR countries. Of all analyzed central banks in the eighties, legal independence was
highest in Switzerland (0.68), West Germany (0.66) and Austria (0.58).
(2) The turnover rates of CB governors were available for Uruguay and Argentina for
the period of 1950 to 1989. For Uruguay it was 0.48 (approximately 2 years) and for Argentina
it was 0.93 (13 months). The legal term for the Argentinean CB governor was four years, which
deviates substantially from the actual term of 13 months. This was due to the Argentinean
                                                
104 These 16 variables are: Term of office (too); Who appoints CEO (app); Provision for dismissal (diss);
Another office held (off); Monetary policy formulation (monpol); Conflict resolution (conf); Active role in the
formulation of government’s budget (adv); CB's objectives (obj); Limit on advances (lla); Limit in securitized
lendings (lls); Who decides on lending terms (ldec); Width of circle of borrowers (lwidth); Type of limit (ltype);
Maturity of loans (lmat); Limit on interest rate (lint); Lending in primary market (lprm).69
tradition that the governor offered his resignation when the government changed. Thus, the
degree of legal independence in Argentina seems to be misleading. Of all analyzed countries
Argentina ranks last in terms of rotation of the central bank governor.
105
(3) The third set of indicators draws on 9 questions
106 which are put as a questionnaire to
monetary specialists. Like the rotation criterion these questions aim at the divergence of legal
and real independence. In Cukierman(1992) the analyzed group of countries only included
Uruguay from the MERCOSUR countries. The indicator of real independence yielded a value of
0.49 for Uruguay, where it ranked 18 out of 24 (non weighted average).
107 Zagari Rigolon(1996)
obtain a degree of real independence of 0.29 for 1980 to 1985 and 0.33 for 1986 to 1989. Like
Uruguay Brazil’s position would be in the last quartile. For the nineties the Brazilian central
bank improved its degree of real independence. It increased to 0.45 in 1992 and to 0.64 in 1996
(see Table 4-12).














Weighted average 0.49 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.45 0.64
Non weighted average 0.49 0.25 0.35 0.35 0.46 0.68
Table 4-12: Degree of real central bank independence in Brazil and Uruguay
Source: Cukierman(1992) and Zagari Rigolon(1996)
More recent indicators on the Argentinean central bank do not exist. Nonetheless, its
degree must have increased significantly after the implementation of the currency board and
successfully coping with a series of external shocks or, as Calomiris and Powell(2000) put it
“...the experience of the Argentine banking sector over the past decade has been unique in
several aspects. Many observers view Argentina’s reforms as among the most radical attempts
to overhaul a banking system.”
The policy formulation variables could not be determined, since there is little reference
made to monetary policy in the Organic Charter. The exchange rate policy is stipulated by law
and its amendment is subject to approval by the National Senate. As a consequence there is no
or only very small room for maneuver for the Argentinean central bank. Hence, the variables
monpol, conf, and adv would be closer to 0 than to 1.
108 However, without detailed knowledge





                                                
105 In the nineties the turnover of central bank governors in Brazil was still considerable. In February 1999
Arminio Fraga was appointed Brazilian central bank governor. He was the fifth governor since the introduction of
the Real Plan (Ambito Financiero, 1999i).
106 The specialists had to assign a value between 0 and 1 to the following questions: Tenure overlap with
political authorities; Limitations on lending practice; resolution of conflict; Who determines the budget of CB?; Who
determines the salaries of high CB officials and the allocation of CB profits?; Are there quantitative monetary stock
targets?; Are there formal or informal interest rate targets?; What is the actual priority assigned to price stability?;
Does the CB function as development bank that grants credits at subsidy rates?
107 Germany was first with a value equal to 1.
108 Compare also Calcagno(1997, p. 66). “Aún podía influir sobre la masa monetaria y sobre la liquidez de
los bancos, através de la fijación de los encajes bancarios, y nada le impedía, en principio, realizar operaciones de
contracción de la base monetaria.” (Still the central bank can have an influence on the monetary aggregate and on






















Table 4-13: Degree of legal central bank
independence of the Argentinean central bank
in 1989 and 1992
Source: Cukierman(1992) and own calculations
In Table 4-13 a non weighted average on all available indicators was computed (except
the policy formulation variables ( monpol,  conv,  adv), which had to be left out). With the
introduction of the Organic Charter of 1992 of the Argentinean Central Bank, compared to the
eighties, the degree of legal independence increased from 0.53 to 0.82.
111
Rotation of central bank governors in Argentina has considerably decreased, too. The
governor currently in office has by far surpassed this average of 13 months, which was
previously the case.
The determination for real independence according to the Cukierman questions was not
possible.
112 Some of the questions will be tentatively answered by the author’s judgement. As
was indicated before, rotation has considerably decreased and adversely the term of the CB
governor has increased to 6 years (qto). Lending practices have stuck to the rules (qll) (compare
Calomiris and Powell, 2000). Naturally, because of the currency board, there are no quantitative
monetary stock targets (qst). Also, as a consequence of the implemented currency board, price
stability is also the principle objective in real policy  (apps). Finally, the Argentinean central
bank does not function as a development bank (qsc). Consequently, the tentatively obtained
indicators for the real independence of the Argentinean central bank would point toward a real
degree of independence similar or even better than that of the Brazilian central bank.
                                                
109 The discount window can be opened by the exchange of dollar denominated government debt – the
emission of the debt is at market rates – it is however unclear from the charter what maturity the debt has – with
varying maturity the interest rate can also deviate from the current market rate
110 Indicators with no account were left out on both sides. Consequently the sum of eleven values was used
for the calculation of the average.
111 The inclusion of the monetary policy variables would have reduced both variables (compare Table
4-11). Assuming unchanged policy formulation variables in 1989 and 1992 would have yielded 0.439 and 0.666
respectively. The increase in legal independence would still be considerable.




The president stays longer than
government
qto 1.0 0.0
Limitations on lending practice qll 1.0 0.66
Resolution of conflict qrc n/a 1.0
Who determines the budget of CB qbcb n/a 0.5
Who determines the salaries of high CB
officials and the allocation of CB profits
qsp n/a 0.5
Are there quantitative monetary stock
targets?
qst 0 0.66
Are there formal or informal interest rate
targets?
qirt n/a 0.0
What is the actual priority assigned to
price stability
qpps 1.0 1.0
Does CB function as a development bank qsc 1.0 1.0
Table 4-14: Real degree of central bank independence in Argentina and Brazil in 1996
Source: Rigolon Zagari(1996) and own approximation72
5  Concluding Remarks
Evidently MERCOSUR will not start negotiating a treaty on a MERCOSUR monetary
union à la Maastricht tomorrow. MERCOSUR is a relatively young integration project.
MERCOSUR was able to profit from considerable momentum in its early stage, in the first half
of the nineties. A difficult economic environment put the weakly institutionalized integration
scheme to test in the second half of the nineties. Efforts in deepening the integration scheme
have virtually come to a halt. Hence from an institutional point of view there is still a long way
to go. Yet MERCOSUR represents nothing more than a customs union. A further deepening of
the integration scheme toward a common market or even monetary union was only manifested
by declarations of intentions. Concrete steps into this direction have not yet been taken. Changes
in the institutional design, that is, a move toward supranational institutions would represent an
essential ingredient for the successful creation of a monetary union. Such a step is conditioned
by political rather than by economic factors. One of the crucial questions for MERCOSUR
monetary union will be whether the largest MERCOSUR country will cede sovereign rights to
supranational MERCOSUR entities.
The Brazilian currency crisis of 1999 clearly illustrated the economical and political
turmoil caused by competitive devaluations. Interestingly, in the beginning of MERCOSUR,
Brazil launched the initiative by setting up exchange rate bands for MERCOSUR, a proposal
which was then rejected by the Argentinean authorities. Thereafter, the tables turned. In 1998
devaluation expectations on the Brazilian real increased drastically that finally culminated in the
currency crisis of January 1999. As a consequence, the Argentinean authorities started to
publicly discuss full dollarization of their economy, thus, reducing the declared desire of
establishing a single MERCOSUR currency to absurdity. Obviously, political consensus on a
possible future common exchange rate will require a great deal of negotiation in MERCOSUR
Economic analysis provided some interesting answers and identified issues to be
investigated further:
The application of the traditional OCA criteria to the MERCOSUR countries would
render MERCOSUR straight forward a non-optimal currency area – a result which was
expected. In the past GDP cycles were highly asymmetrical. They differed in timing, size and
duration. From this point of view one would have to argue that in the absence of acceptable
wage flexibility and alternative adjustment mechanisms as, for instance, fiscal transfers or
mobile labor equilibrating the abandonment of a flexible exchange rate would be very costly for
the MERCOSUR countries. Such a conclusion, however, would abstract from two basic aspects.
(1) The only indicator analyzed was the GDP variable. A sophisticated identification of different
shocks could not be undertaken. (2) From the description of stylized facts it can be assumed that
many of the shocks were of endogenous nature due to the stop-and-go policies very common
during the analyzed period 1980-1995. Thereafter, all MERCOSUR economies had become
relatively more stable and evidently exogenous shocks prevailed in the second half of the
nineties. Further, the conjecture cannot be dismissed that the endogeneity of the OCA criteria
started to play a role during the nineties, and continued to do so. Certainly a historistic approach
will be even more misleading in recently stabilized economies compared to economies that are
generally characterized by a less volatile environment.
If once concluded that shocks possibly occur asymmetrically, alternative adjustment73
instruments to a flexible exchange rate regime should be analyzed. The empirical analysis of
labor mobility within MERCOSUR suggested that labor moved from the smaller to the larger
countries in the past. Consequently an asymmetrical shock between Argentina and Brazil would
not have been equilibrated by moving labor, as far as timing is concerned. It can also be doubted
that labor between the smaller countries moved to balance for asymmetrical shocks. Usually a
bundle of heterogeneous motives are responsible for labor migration (political and economical
motives) which are not covered by simple migration statistics and which are simply not taken
into account in the OCA literature.
Wage flexibility in the MERCOSUR countries is low but unions seem to have lost
power in the recent years. It is questionable when and in how far labor laws will allow for up-
and downward adjustment of wages. Flexibilization of labor laws would be a logical step in
economies that already were and still are subject to further liberalization. Hence, the assumption
of increasing wage flexibility in the future should not be speculated on.
Capital seems to be the most mobile factor within MERCOSUR. The integration of
capital markets had already started prior to the creation of MERCOSUR. Both the CID and the
Feldstein-Horioka equation suggest highly integrated financial markets in Uruguay and
Argentina, less so in Brazil. In the case of MERCOSUR, financial market integration with the
rest of the world seems to be much more important than within MERCOSUR. Capital will flow
between the United States/Euroland and Argentina rather than between the MERCOSUR
countries. Up to now financial markets integration within MERCOSUR has not advanced too
much. Further, portfolio capital movements do not necessarily balance for asymmetrical shocks.
Even worse, portfolio capital movements can represent an additional source of shocks.
Finally, the McKinnon criterion was applied to MERCOSUR. As could be expected, the
larger the economy was, the lower the degree of trade openness was. Nonetheless, Brazil’s low
level of intra-MERCOSUR share was not really expected. The high growth rate of bilateral 
trade with Argentina leaves room for speculation about increasing interdependence between the
two large MERCOSUR countries. Paraguay and Uruguay show high interdependence with the
two large MERCOSUR countries and would thus, according to the McKinnon criterion,
represent far more optimal candidates for a monetary union than Argentina and Brazil. Intra-
industry trade between Brazil and Argentina was at similar levels in 1985 and 1996, close to
50% in both measures (3 digtis and 5 digits). It is relatively difficult to draw a clear cut
conclusion from the material available due to its limited comparability. All in all, even though
Brazil’s trade with Argentina and MERCOSUR is relatively unimportant, intra-industry trade
seems to be quite significant at levels close to 50% and 40%.
This work, however, should have contributed to the insight, that the singular application
of these indicators is only of limited value, if any at all. The endogeneity argument for
MERCOSUR is very important. Economic models in all MERCOSUR countries were subject to
major and minor changes during the last three decades. Further liberalization on the national
level and also a deepening of the MERCOSUR integration scheme is highly probable. It is hard
to predict of which nature (qualitatively and quantitatively) the effects of ongoing integration
will be. Neither is it the objective of this work to speculate on these effects.
Differences in productivity in MERCOSUR are likely to persist. Suspected swings in the
long-run real exchange rate, under the assumption of a nominally fixed exchange rate or a
common currency, makes increased wage flexibility desirable. Thus, the MERCOSUR countries
should strive for more flexible labor markets. More flexible labor markets would increase the
optimality of the MERCOSUR region as a currency area. Until the mid-nineties, shocks to the
MERCOSUR countries were highly asymmetrical. In the second half of the nineties,
symmetrical exogenous shocks gained importance. The latter development, under historicist74
assumptions, represents an argument for a single MERCOSUR currency. As mentioned before,
little can be said about the future behavior of the cycles of the single MERCOSUR economies.
From this point of view, ongoing economic analysis of the MERCOSUR countries is necessary
in order to learn more about the comovement of MERCOSUR cycles. Future economic analysis
should also include the two smaller MERCOSUR countries Paraguay and Uruguay (and the
associate members Chile and Bolivia, too). This is even more desirable, since current studies on
MERCOSUR of Argentinean and Brazilian origin tend to concentrate merely on the two large
MERCOSUR economies.
For real word considerations, however, the De Grauwe-citation: „Therefore, it is utopian
to separate the problem of monetary union from political unification... Monetary union is an
essential part of political union.“is very true. If  economic disequilibria combined with the
absence of consensus on monetary and economic policy prevail impulses rather for
disintegration than integration can be the consequence. Already the Brazilian currency crisis put
much distress on MERCOSUR. The integration process has virtually come to a halt. Another
much feared currency crisis this time in Argentina would increase the probability of a
dissolution of MERCOSUR. Monetary union could stay utopia, in the words of De Grauwe.
Another scenario would be, everything stays as it is. Argentina muddles individually through its
problems as do the other MERCOSUR countries and MERCOSUR stays in its current stage of
economic integration. Further monetary integration may be an issue in the far future or not. Mid-
term, however, monetary policy coordination could gradually be increased, maybe, ending at
some degree of exchange rate coordination indicated before in order to avoid further disruptions
as caused by the Brazilian crisis. The final stage, that would need a large portion of consensus in
a broad range of political fields, could be monetary union. Nonetheless, a big deal internal in
overcoming economic difficulties in the MERCOSUR countries is needed before one could
seriously think about successfully deepening monetary integration in MERCOSUR.Bibliography 75
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